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SUMMARY 
 
Historically, racism was deeply rooted in the workplace in South Africa where white 
people were largely afforded better opportunities than their black counterparts.  This 
position changed after South Africa became a democratic country.  In the new South 
Africa, legislation has been adopted to combat unfair discrimination.  This legislation 
is founded upon the equality clause contained in section 9 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa. 
 
Section 9 prohibits unfair direct or indirect discrimination against any person on any 
of the listed grounds.  It also makes provision for protection against unfair 
discrimination on unlisted grounds. The Employment Equity Act was enacted to bring 
equality to the workplace and to give effect to section 9(2) of the Constitution.  The 
Employment Equity Act promotes equal opportunities and fair treatment and seeks to 
eliminate unfair discrimination.  Section 6 of the Employment Equity Act contains the 
main thrust of the Act’s prohibition against unfair discrimination.   
 
However not all discrimination is unfair.  Section 6(2) of the Employment Equity Act 
provides that discrimination based on the inherent requirements of a job or in terms 
of affirmative action measures will not be unfair.  This section implies that there are 
grounds of justification which may cause discrimination to be fair.  These grounds are 
affirmative action and inherent requirements of a job. 
 
Affirmative action is a purposeful and planned placement and development of 
competent or potentially competent persons in or to positions from which they were 
debarred in the past.  Affirmative action is an attempt to redress past population, on 
local and national level.  One of the requirements of affirmative action in South Africa 
is that it must target persons who have been discriminated by unfair discrimination in 
the past.  
 
There are affirmative action measures incorporated in the Employment Equity Act.  
There exists also a designed programmatic enforcement of affirmative action 
measures. 
 v 
 
There have been extreme hurdles in successfully pursuing a claim underlying the 
procedure of unfair discrimination.  Our courts have provided some insight into what 
essential allegations should be made by an applicant to support a discrimination 
claim.  The aforementioned insight is provided in the case of Harmse v City of Cape 
Town (2003) 24 ILJ 1130 (LC) and in the case of Dudley v City of Cape Town and 
another (2004) 25 ILJ 305.  Both the aforementioned cases reached conflicting 
decisions; however, they have a significant impact on other subsequent cases 
dealing with the enforcement of affirmative action. 
 
The courts have consistently maintained that there needs to be a rational connection 
between affirmative action measures and the goal to be achieved.  Affirmative action 
is accordingly and rightfully so, justification for apparent discrimination, however, 
failure upon a designated employer in applying affirmative action measures, may be 
problematic upon the latter. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Affirmative action is a very controversial topic and raises strong emotions from 
people.  The focus of this treatise is to explore and develop an understanding on the 
enforcement mechanisms of affirmative action measures.  A research in this area is 
vital for both the present and future claims falling within the ambit of alleged unfair 
discrimination in an employment relationship. 
 
Before the 1994 elections, South Africa followed a deeply rooted racist approach, 
where white people were favoured over black people.  In 1995, when South Africa 
became a democratic country, this all changed.  The promulgation of the new Labour 
Relations Act1 (hereinafter referred to as “the LRA”) brought about numerous 
changes to the role of the workforce in South Africa. 
 
The new Constitution of the Republic of South Africa2 (hereinafter referred to as “the 
Constitution”), in particular section 9 thereof dealing with equality, states that 
“everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection”.3  Section 
9(2) highlights that in order to achieve equality, legislation will have to be aligned in 
such a way that it will protect and advance those who are victims of unfair 
discrimination.  Owing to the latter, the notion of equality is central in understanding 
affirmative action. 
 
In 1998 more light was shed with the introduction of the Employment Equity Act4 
(hereinafter referred to as “the EEA”).  The main objective behind the EEA5 was to 
remove barriers associated with black people and in particular black women who 
were prevented from accessing jobs that were reserved for men.  The EEA6 focuses 
on issues pertaining to affirmative action and unfair discrimination. 
  
                                                          
1  Act 66 of 1995. 
2  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
3  S 9(1). 
4  Act 55 of 1998. 
5  Ibid. 
6  Ibid. 
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Section 13 of the EEA7 imposes duties on designated employers to implement 
affirmative action measures and section 15 thereof highlights certain measures to 
ensure equitable representation in all employment categories. 
 
Since the central gravity of this treatise is based on the programmatic enforcement of 
affirmative action, it very essential for a person to understand all the terms 
incorporated in the latter phrase.  In order to approach this discussion properly and in 
a systematic manner, it is important for one to firstly understand the background of 
affirmative action; the notion of equality and the EEA; the programmatic enforcement 
of affirmative action in terms of the EEA; and the influence of certain Court decision 
in enforcing affirmative action. 
 
Owing to the aforementioned, Chapter 2 of this study will give a brief introduction and 
background to affirmative action.  This Chapter will highlight the meaning of 
affirmative action and how it was formally introduced in our law.  Upon grasping the 
development and origin of affirmative action, the Chapter will shift focus primarily to 
the advantages of affirmative action and historical disadvantages thereof.  By the end 
of Chapter 1, an individual would have grasped the basic concept of affirmative 
action and the purpose thereof. 
 
Chapter 3 deals with the notion of equality and the EEA.  In this Chapter we will focus 
on the Constitution, in particular section 9 thereof and how it forms the basis of 
legislation that is aimed to restore the rights of previously disadvantaged groups or 
categories of people.  It will transpire in Chapter 3 that the EEA, despite giving effect 
to the national legislation as contemplated in the Constitution, it gives effect to the 
international obligations of the Republic as a member of the International Labour 
Organisation.  Thereafter we will focus on the purpose of the EEA and the manner in 
which affirmative action presents itself within the context of the EEA both as a duty 
and as a defence.   
  
                                                          
7  “…Every designated employer must, in order to achieve employment equity, implement 
affirmative action measures for people from designated groups in terms of this Act.” 
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Chapter 3 will further highlight the meaning of a “designated employer” and 
“affirmative action measures”.  Owing to the latter, this Chapter will further deal briefly 
with the Code of Good Practice (Preparation, implementation and monitoring of 
employment equity plans). 
 
Chapter 4 outlines the programmatic enforcement of affirmative action in terms of the 
EEA.  It also entails certain annexures which give a practical insight of the procedure 
followed in enforcing affirmative action. 
 
Owing to having some court decisions giving some insight to essential allegations 
which should be made by an applicant to support a discrimination claim linked to 
affirmative action measures, Chapter 5 focus on the influence of Harmse v City of 
Cape Town (2003) 24 ILJ 1130 (LC).  It will transpire from the outcome of the 
aforementioned case that the Court found that there is an individual right to 
affirmative action. 
 
Chapter 6 will outline the influence of Dudley v City of Cape Town and another 
(2004) 25 ILJ 305 on affirmative action and the right to affirmative action. 
 
Lastly, Chapter 7 is the conclusion of the study in its entirety and Chapter 8 will 
reflect all the sources used in compiling this study. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The term affirmative action carries many meanings in today’s society.  Often the term 
elicits strong feelings – positive and negative.  Frequently these feelings derive from 
a misunderstanding of what affirmative action is all about.8  Affirmative action can 
mean many things.  Generally, affirmative action is seen as a reform.9  It may refer to 
“racial preferential treatment for good reasons”.  It could mean the redistribution of 
resources and opportunities.  It may also refer to preferential financial assistance to 
those communities which have been traditionally disadvantaged.10  It has been 
described as a governmental policy to make reparation for disadvantage caused by 
the past governmental or widespread social repression.11 
 
Affirmative action can also be described as a systematic, planned process whereby 
the effects of colonialism and racial discrimination are being reversed in almost all 
areas of life.  Through proactive programmes, affirmative action provides 
opportunities which were not previously available to black people; in other words; 
affirmative action is about the economic and social empowerment of black people.12 
 
Bendix13 defines affirmative action as “the purposeful and planned placement or 
development of competent or potentially competent persons in or to positions from 
which they were debarred in the past, in an attempt to redress past population, on 
local and national level”. 
  
                                                          
8  Blanchard Affirmative Action in Perspective (1989) 9. 
9  McGregor “The Nature of Affirmative Action: A Defence or a Right? Case Comments” (2003) 
15(3) SA Merc LJ 424. 
10  Adams Affirmative Action in a Democratic South Africa (1993) 1. 
11  McGregor “The Nature of Affirmative Action: A Defence or a Right?” 424. 
12  Qunta Who’s Afraid of Affirmative Action (1995) 6. 
13  Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa (2006) 435. 
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Grogan states that “affirmative action is a programme or policy in terms of which a 
group of people are accorded preferential treatment on the basis of some common 
characteristic”.14 
 
Affirmative action in South Africa refers to policies that take factors including “race, 
colour, religion, sex or national origin” into consideration in order to benefit an 
underrepresented group, usually as means to counter the effects of a history of 
discrimination.  The focus of such policies ranges from employment and education to 
public contracting and health programs.  Affirmative action in South Africa thus 
ensures that qualified people from designated groups have equal opportunities in the 
workplace.15 
 
Affirmative action is sometimes regarded as a form of reverse discrimination and it is 
believed that some companies are merely appointing individuals who are less suited 
and possess far fewer expertise and qualifications; in an attempt to fill quotas.  
Various critics believe that the implementation of the EEA is a form of reverse 
discrimination as well as racism; as it is designed to provide non-white people with 
preferential treatment.  It is also believed that affirmative action only benefits a few 
individuals and it is a fight of black versus white.16 
 
Affirmative action has been labelled as reverse discrimination as it entails favoured 
treatment towards a specific racial group. It is presumed to be disfavoured treatment 
towards white males in particular.  This belief would prove true had there been no 
prior discrimination before and if affirmative action was not aimed at levelling the 
playground of the past.17 
  
                                                          
14  Grogan Employment Rights (2010) 250. 
15 “Basic Guide to South African Affirmative Action” <http://humanresourcessouthafrica.co.za/ 
basic-guide-to-affirmative-action-south-africa> (accessed 30/02/2014). 1. 
16  Kongolo & Bojuwoye “South African Experience of Gender and Affirmative Action: A Research 
Report” (2006) 10(3) Gender, Technology and Development 372. 
17  Chetty “Should the Principle of Affirmative Action be a Consideration when Retrenching 
Employees” (2009) Legal Magazine 3. 
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It is of importance for companies to note that affirmative action is not reverse 
discrimination due to the fact that there was no fairness in the first instance.  The role 
of affirmative action should be seen as a tool that will combat racism.18  The EEA 
signifies the most significant attempts by the post-apartheid government to achieve 
equality at workplace.  The Act’s19 proactive mechanism is affirmative action.20  
 
Although the basis for affirmative action was laid in the Constitution,21 affirmative 
action was formally introduced into our law in terms of the EEA.  The EEA provides 
for both formal22 and substantive23 approach to equality.  The formal equality 
provided for in the EEA relates to the elimination and prohibition of unfair 
discrimination.24  The substantive equality provided for in the EEA relates to the 
compulsory implementation of affirmative action measures to redress the 
disadvantages in employment experiences by designated groups in order to ensure 
their equitable representation in all occupational categories and levels in the 
workforce.25 
 
                                                          
18  Chetty “Should the Principle of Affirmative Action be a Consideration when Retrenching 
Employees” 3. 
19  Act 55 of 1998. 
20  Partington & Van der Walt “The Development of Defences in Unfair Discrimination Cases (Part 
2)” (2005) 26(2) Obiter 595. 
21 S 9(2) of the Constitution provides that in order to promote the achievement of equality, 
legislative measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, 
disadvantaged by discrimination, may be taken. 
22 Formal equality means that all persons are treated equally regardless of their actual personal 
circumstances and regardless of the social and economic differences between individuals and 
groups.  A formal approach to equality is premised on the assumption that the evils of inequality 
can be eradicated by treating all individuals according to a neutral standard in an identical way.  
It fails, however, to recognize the existence of deeply rooted patterns of group disadvantage in 
society, in other words, the existence of structural or systematic inequality.  See Carole Cooper 
The boundaries of equality in Labour Law 1 (2004) 25 ILJ 813 to 817. 
23  Substantive equality means that in order to attain true equality, all persons are not treated 
equally.  A substantive concept of equality recognizes the reality of present justice caused by 
past discrimination and the deep levels of systematic inequality on the basis of gender, race and 
other grounds, which have been inherited from the past.  It proposes that in order for full 
equality to be achieved this systematic inequality needs to be addressed and eradicated.  
Those who have suffered from disadvantage in the past are entitled to preferential or 
advantageous treatment or positive unequal treatment in the present so that genuine equality 
for all will ultimately emerge in society in the future.  As stated by Kentridge, “[t]reating all 
persons in a formally equal way now is not going to change the patterns of the past, for that 
inequality needs to be redressed and not simply removed”.  See Kentridge “Equality” in 
Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law of SA at 14-4. 
24  S 2(a) Act 55 of 1998. 
25  S 2(b) Act 55 of 1988. 
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One of the requirements for affirmative action in South Africa is that it must target 
persons or categories of persons who have been disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination.26  In order for an individual to be able to understand affirmative action 
in its entirety, including the motives behind its application, it is very important for the 
individual to be introduced to its origin and development.  As a result of the latter, this 
Chapter deals with the background of affirmative action and highlights the 
advantages and disadvantages associated with it. 
 
2.2 ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
 
This concept of affirmative action originated in the Unites States of America 
(hereinafter referred to as “the USA”) in the 1960s, its purpose was to repair 
injustices and racial imbalances that existed in the country.  In simple terms, 
affirmative action was aimed at ensuring that all the race groups in America could 
enjoy the same rights as the majority of the white Americans and also be given equal 
education and equal employment opportunities.  From the beginning it was known 
that it would only be a temporary measure until the playing field was equalled 
between all Americans.27 
 
One advantage of dismantling apartheid is that it grants us the opportunity to learn 
from other countries’ successes and failures with regards to implementing affirmative 
action.  In the USA, affirmative action was introduced to address racial discrimination 
and inequality. 
 
The term affirmative action may be American, but affirmative action also occurred in 
India, Malaysia, Sri-Lanka as well as in South Africa before it was introduced as a 
formal policy in the USA.28 
 
Colonialism, sexism and apartheid in South Africa prevented black people and 
women of all races from getting equal education and equal opportunity to compete in 
                                                          
26  S 9(2) Act 108 of 1996. 
27  Kongolo & Bojuwoye “South African Experience of Gender and Affirmative Action: A Research 
Report” 361. 
28  Charlton and Van Niekerk Affirming Action: Beyond 1994 (1994) 37-38. 
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the labour market.29  Historically black people in South Africa were subjected to 
inferior education, they were told where they could live and work.  Black people were 
not allowed to vote and their social security grants were four times less than what 
whites were receiving.  Black people were classed as fourth-classed citizens and 
they were judged by the colour of their skin and not by their skills or character.30 
 
Blacks needed permission from the Minister of Education if they wanted to pursue 
studies in scientific, technical or professional qualifications at university level.  The 
non-white Universities were also ill resourced and did not offer exclusive courses 
such as medicine and engineering.  Once black people had completed their studies, 
they were only allowed to work in jobs that whites were unwilling to perform or jobs 
that were not reserved for whites.  Blacks were also paid less and most of their 
wages were spent on renting township houses and commuting far distances to work.  
Blacks were not allowed to strike and were denied labour rights.31  Prior to 1994, all 
persons who lived in South Africa were categorized as African, Coloured, Indian or 
White and all non-whites were segregated and denied jobs due to their race.32  The 
history of the legislative scheme in our country before 1994 and the grave injustices 
perpetrated left deep scars which are still visible in our society in many facets of our 
lives, including the labour market: 
 
“Until recently, very many areas of public and private life were invaded by 
systematic legal separateness coupled with legally enforced advantage and 
disadvantage.  The impact of structured and vast inequality is still with us despite 
the new constitutional order.”33 
 
People were divided into different groups.  In terms of the labels which were attached 
to them as members of those groups, they were then given certain rights and 
privileges.  These appalling practices left behind a deeply divided society.  With this 
legacy which was left behind, it was not sufficient to simply eliminate and prohibit 
discriminatory practices and give every person an equal opportunity to compete for 
                                                          
29  Jordaan, Kalula and Strydom Understanding the Employment Equity Act (2009) 1. 
30  Charlton and Van Niekerk Affirming Action: Beyond 1994 22. 
31  Nongena “Affirmative Action is Fair Discrimination” (2007) No 30 Umrabulo. 
32  Kongolo and Bojuwoye “South African Experience of Gender and Affirmative Action: A 
Research Report” 363. 
33  Ackerman, O’Regan and Sachs in Prinsloo v Van der Linde and Another 1997 (3) SA1012 (CC) 
at par 20. 
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jobs.  More was needed.  Ending and prohibiting discriminatory practices and policies 
would not have automatically levelled the playing fields.  Treating all employees 
equally by simply eliminating and prohibiting unfair discrimination would actually not 
have amounted to true equality, but would have perpetuated the inequality in the 
labour market for many years to come and would have made it impossible for black 
people and women to make significant progress in the workplace: 
 
“You do not take a person who, for years, have been hobbled by chains and liberate 
him, bring him up to the starting line of the race and then say, you are free to 
compete with all the others.”34 
 
Remedial measures were therefore required to ensure that black people and women 
would become equitably represented in the workplace at all levels and job 
categories.  It was against this background that affirmative action was introduced in 
our law. 
 
Affirmative action was implemented in South Africa to ensure the majority black 
population would reap the same opportunities and benefits of the minority whites.35 
 
After 1994 when the new government came into power it was noted that blacks, 
women and persons with disabilities were still being treated unfairly in terms of 
employment.  Black people were mainly employed in low-paying jobs and during the 
apartheid era, black women, who represent 51.2 percent of the population, were 
mainly employed as cleaners and earned very little. 
 
Therefore, it is to be known that affirmative action is about levelling the playing field 
amongst this population and eliminate inequality in the workplace.  With affirmative 
action, it is expected that the black South Africans would comprise at least 69 
percent of the labour force.36 
 
                                                          
34  Former US President Lyndon Johnson Commencement Address “To Fulfill these Rights” at 
Howard University, 4 June 1965. 
35  Grogan Employment Rights 250. 
36  Kongolo and Bojuwoye “South African Experience of Gender and Affirmative Action: A 
Research Report” 362. 
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In the same way USA approached affirmative action, South Africa necessitated the 
use of affirmative action to guide transformation and bring about equality and redress 
past imbalances and injustices brought about by the apartheid government.  The only 
difference between USA and South Africa is: In the USA, affirmative action was 
meant as a temporary measure to ensure blacks and other minorities enjoyed the 
same benefits as the majority whites; in South Africa the situation is somewhat 
different, affirmative action was brought in to benefit the majority, that being blacks, 
especially black women and people with disabilities.37 
 
The rationale for introducing affirmative action measures and goals which such 
measures were meant to achieve in post-apartheid South Africa were summarized by 
former President Nelson Mandela,38 who was quoted as follows in the Explanatory 
Memorandum to the EEA: 
 
“This legislation is drafted with view to advancing those groups who have been 
disadvantaged as a result of discrimination caused by laws and social practices, and 
not with a view of seeking retribution for past injustice.  As President Mandela has 
said, ‘The primary aims of affirmative action must be to redress the imbalances 
created by apartheid.  We are not asking for hand outs for anyone nor saying that 
just as a white skin was a passport to privilege in the past, so black skin should be 
the basis of privilege in the future.  Nor is it our aim to do away with qualifications. 
 
What we against is not the upholding of standards as such but the sustaining of 
barriers to the attainment of standards.  The special measures that we envisage to 
overcome the legacy of past discrimination are not intended to ensure the 
advancement of unqualified persons, but to see to it that those who have been 
denied access to qualifications in the past can become qualified now, and those who 
have been qualified all along but overlooked because of past discrimination, are at 
last given their due.  The first point to be made is that affirmative action must be 
rooted in principles of justice and equality.” 
 
2.3 ADVANTAGES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
 
Chetty39 identifies that the benefits of affirmative action are that it will redress past 
discrimination and combat structural racism as well as racial inequality; it will further 
                                                          
37  Ibid. 
38  President Nelson Mandela, opening statement to the ANC Conference on Affirmative Action 
Port Elizabeth, October 1991. 
39  Chetty “Should the Principle of Affirmative Action be a Consideration when Retrenching 
Employees” 4. 
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allow equal access to all members of society and will enhance the standards of the 
lower class. 
 
According to Charlton and Van Niekerk,40 affirmative action will benefit the 
beneficiaries in the following ways: 
 
• Access to resources  such as transport and social welfare; 
• Economic empowerment which includes enhanced education and the 
creation of employment opportunities; 
• Political rights – previously disadvantaged persons are now allowed to vote; 
• Psychological growth leading to an improved quality of life, restoring human 
dignity and a boost in confidence ; and 
• Improvement of basic needs including security, food and housing. 
 
Charlton and Van Niekerk41 make note of the fact that some of these “benefits” are in 
actual fact rights which people are entitled to when they are born.  The mere fact that 
people construe them as benefits is a clear indication of the extent of affirmative 
action suffered by individuals. 
 
The Black Management forum, as quoted by Theron and Viljoen,42 states that 
affirmative action should have the following objectives: 
 
• Affirmative action should help reverse the existing conditions of the 
disadvantaged; 
• Affirmative action must create opportunities whereby organizations can offer 
education, training and development for its employees; 
• That the above mentioned opportunities will result in economic empowerment 
that is visible for the beneficiaries’ at all organizational levels; and 
• Affirmative action must bring about transformation with regards to racist and 
sexist attitudes of the past. 
                                                          
40  Charlton and Van Niekerk Affirming Action: Beyond 1994 xv. 
41  Charlton and Van Niekerk Affirming Action: Beyond 1994 xv. 
42  Theron and Viljoen “An Affirmative Action Audit for Affirmative Change: A Management 
Perspective” (2001) 4(2) SAJEMS NS 334. 
 12 
 
2.4 HISTORICAL DISADVANTAGES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
 
One of the main disadvantages of affirmative action is that it originated in the USA in 
the 1960s and since then not much has been achieved.  In the South African context 
it has had some controversy surrounding it and due to this the South African 
parliament passed the EEA to assist with the problems and redress skewed 
employment statistics.43 
 
Affirmative action has been a battleground in South Africa.  In the USA after more 
than 20 years of affirmative action, it was revealed by the government that affirmative 
action was actually a failure purely because affirmative action programmes were not 
introduced properly nor were employees’ perceptions of said programmes managed.  
It should be noted that when employees regard something as unfair they tend to 
reject it and therefore any further recourses will fail.  For South Africa to make a 
success of affirmative action, companies will need to address employees’ concerns; 
as well as understand what the behaviours and attitudes of employees are that can 
lead to success within the organisation.44 
 
Another disadvantage of affirmative action is that it is seen as inferior and stigmatizes 
the beneficiaries and that people are awarded the position based on preferential 
treatment rather than on merit.  Some individuals believe that affirmative action was 
put in place as retribution against white people and affects young white males who 
were not involved in affirmative action.  South African organisations will continue to 
be evaluated on how they have achieved equity targets.  Businesses will thus be 
under pressure to implement affirmative action programmes to assist in the fairness 
and legal requirements.45 
 
                                                          
43  Kongolo and Bojuwoye “South African Experience of Gender and Affirmative Action: A 
Research Report” 372. 
44  Vermeulen & Coetzee “Perceptions of the Dimensions of the Fairness of Affirmative Action: A 
Pilot Study” (2006) South African Journal of Business Management 53. 
45  Ibid. 
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Charlton & Van Niekerk46 presents three arguments against affirmative action, 
namely: 
 
An economics-based argument.  The latter is when less qualified individuals are 
placed in positions and the result damages economy.  This argument entails the 
demotivation of better qualified white people who are over looked for promotion and 
some even leave the country in search for better opportunities.  
 
The second argument is that of principle.  Affirmative action in this context can be 
seen as positive discrimination as it “perpetuates racial discrimination and 
exacerbates tensions”.47  It involves implementing quotas which restrict white people 
and benefits black people.  In essence this means one person will always lose.  
 
The third argument entails a revolutionary option.  It simply states that if something is 
not working, one needs to change it. 
 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
 
Prior to 1994, black people were seen as outcasts and were treated as such by 
having access to inferior education and only being allowed to have jobs which white 
people did not want, which were often menial.  They were judged based on the 
colour of their skin and not by their skills.  In South Africa people were categorized 
and segregated according to their skin colour.  White people were the minority and 
black people were the majority, however white people were the only ones who were 
afforded the best jobs.  The EEA was implemented to remedy this discrepancy, in an 
effort to bring equality to all races. 
 
The reason for the implementation of affirmative action in South Africa was to ensure 
that the majority black population would be afforded the same opportunities and 
benefits of their white counterparts.  The advantage of implementing affirmative 
action was that it would reverse existing conditions of those who have been 
disadvantaged.  The disadvantage, however is that it stigmatises people and in some 
                                                          
46  Charlton and Van Niekerk Affirming Action: Beyond 1994 13. 
47  Ibid. 
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instances people are placed into positions based on preferential treatment rather 
than based on merit.  Critics have stated that affirmative action and the introduction 
of the EEA could also be a form of reverse discrimination in that it is a fight of black 
versus white. 
  
 15 
CHAPTER 3 
THE NOTION OF EQUALITY AND THE EMPLOYMENT EQUITY ACT 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Our courts are constantly confronted with complex equality claims which raise issues 
of restoration, reparation and redressing.  Owing to the latter, our courts have to 
make difficult decisions which in turn contribute towards the development of our 
progressive equality jurisprudence and ultimately the achievement of the 
constitutional vision of equality. 
 
Equality is a central objective in the promulgation of the EEA.  Hailed as something of 
a landmark in South African employment history, the EEA makes a significant 
contribution to reshaping the socio-economic and political framework of South Africa.  
This is ultimately achieved through the normalisation of the workplace, as well as 
through the creation of a sense of equity and justice.48 
 
The EEA was enacted to give effect to the constitutional right of equality in the 
workplace.  In terms of the Constitution, in particular section 9 thereof: 
 
“(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and 
benefit of the law. 
 
(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms.  To 
promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed 
to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by 
unfair discrimination may be taken. 
 
(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on 
one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, 
ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, 
conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. 
 
(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on 
one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3).  National legislation must be 
enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination. 
 
                                                          
48  Venter, Levy, Bendeman and Dworzanowski-Venter Labour Relations in South Africa (2014) 
265. 
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(5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair 
unless it is established that the discrimination is fair.” 
 
For the purposes of this treatise, section 9(2) of the Constitution as aforementioned 
reflects a crucial possibility for the implementation of affirmative action measures.  
The latter allows for the enactment of legislative and other measures designed to 
advance persons or categories of persons previously disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination.  Section 9(2)49 forms the basis of legislation that aims to restore the 
rights of previously disadvantaged groups or categories of people and to empower 
them.  While the Constitution guarantees everyone the right to equality, it also 
recognises the need for restoration and reparation.  Equality is a fundamental right 
and the importance thereof was explained by Moseneke J in Minister of Finance v 
Van Heerden (2004) 25 ILJ 1593 (CC).50 
 
The EEA is regarded as justifiable in view of the constitutional mandate to restore 
people’s rights in terms of section 9(2).51  It aims to correct the demographic 
imbalance in the nation’s workforce by compelling employers to remove barriers to 
advancement of blacks, women and the disabled, and actively to advance them in all 
categories of employment by affirmative action.52  Furthermore, despite giving effect 
to the national legislation as contemplated in the Constitution, the EEA gave effect to 
the international obligations of the Republic as a member of the International Labour 
Organisation (hereinafter referred to as “the ILO”). 
 
The purpose of the EEA is to achieve equality in the workplace by promoting equal 
opportunity and fair treatment in employment through the elimination of unfair 
discrimination; as well as implementing affirmative action measures that will redress 
the disadvantages experienced by designated groups, in order to achieve equitable 
representation in all occupational categories and levels in the workforce.53  Grogan54 
                                                          
49  Act 108 of 1996. 
50  “…the achievement of equality goes to the bedrock of our Constitution architecture.  The 
Constitution commands us to strive for a society built on the democratic values of human 
dignity, the achievement of quality, the advancement of human rights and freedom.  Thus the 
achievement of equality is not only a guaranteed and justiciable right in our Bill of Rights bit also 
a core and foundational value; a standard which must inform all law and against which all law 
must be tested for constitutional consonance. 
51  Act 108 of 1996. 
52  Grogan Workplace Law 6th ed (2001) 267. 
53  S 2(a)(b) Act 55 of 1998. 
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states that the EEA is in place so that employers can promote opportunity in the 
workplace by eliminating unfair discrimination in any employment policy or practice.55 
 
Section 2 of the EEA is now amended by the Employment Equity Amendment Act 47 
of 2013 to apply to occupational levels only, as opposed to occupational levels and 
categories, in order to simply the Application of the Act. 
 
“Designated groups” means black people, women and people with disabilities.56  
“Black people” is a generic term that means Africans, Coloureds and Indians.57  The 
Act58 does not apply to members of the National Defence Force, the National 
Intelligence Agency or to the South African Secret Service. 
 
The Employment Equity Amendment Act 47 of 2013 revises the notion of the 
designated group to include black people, women and people with disabilities who 
became citizens of the Republic of South Africa by naturalization before 27 April 
1994 or after 26 April, but would have been entitled to acquire citizenship before this 
date were it not for having been precluded by Apartheid.  This essentially means that 
foreign nationals who became citizens after the first democratic elections cannot be 
used by an organisation to achieve equality targets.59 
 
The EEA can be divided into two main parts.  The first deals with unfair discrimination 
(Chapter 2) and the second with affirmative action (Chapter 3).  The remainder of the 
Act details the mechanism instituted to prevent discrimination and promote 
affirmative action.60 
 
Despite the EEA being two folded in that it deals with the prohibition of unfair 
discrimination and the implementation of affirmative action measures, this Chapter is 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
54  Grogan Employment Rights 171. 
55  S 5 Act 55 of 1998. 
56  Section 1 Act 55 of 1998. 
57  Ibid. 
58  Act 55 of 1998. 
59  Venter, Levy, Bendeman and Dworzanowski-Venter Labour Relations in South Africa (2014) 
265. 
60  Venter et al Labour Relations in South Africa 265. 
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primarily concerned with the implementation of affirmative action measures as the 
latter is the central subject matter in this study. 
 
3.2 AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
 
Section 2(b) of the EEA provides that: 
 
“The purpose of this Act is to achieve equality in the workplace by implementing 
affirmative action measures to redress the disadvantages in employment 
experienced by designated groups, in order to ensure their equitable representation 
in all occupational categories and levels in the workforce.” 
 
Furthermore, section 6 of the EEA explicitly states that: 
 
“(1) No person may unfairly discriminate either directly or indirectly, against an 
employee, in any employment policy or practice, on one or more grounds, 
including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, 
colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, 
language and birth. 
 
(2)(a) It is not unfair discrimination to take affirmative action measures consistent 
with the purposes of this Act; …” 
 
The Employment Equity Amendment Act 47 of 2013 includes the notion of “any other 
arbitrary ground” as a basis for unfair discrimination.  In addition to the 
aforementioned, section 13 of the EEA provides that: 
 
“(1) Every designated employer must, in order to achieve employment 
equity, implement affirmative action measures for people from designated 
groups in terms if this Act.” 
 
It is important to take note that affirmative action, as evident in the aforementioned 
provisions, presents itself within the context of the EEA both as a duty and as a 
defence. 
 
Legal space for affirmative action was created by section 8(3)(a) of the interim 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,61 which sanctioned “measures designed 
to achieve the adequate protection and advancement of persons or groups of 
                                                          
61  Act 2000 of 1993. 
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persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, in order to enable their full and equal 
enjoyment of all rights and freedoms”. 
 
Affirmative action measure consistent with the EEA and the Constitution are not 
presumptively unfair.62  Such measures are not derogating from, but forming a 
substantive and composite part of equality protection envisaged by the Constitution 
as a whole.63  It is very essential for one to distinguish between the means and ends 
of affirmative action.  While the latter (purpose) will always be fair, the former 
(measures used to achieve the goal of affirmative action) in some instances may be 
too excessive or so repressive of the previously advantaged group’s rights and 
interests and thus unfair.64  Affirmative action measures are therefore not an absolute 
defence in cases of unfair discrimination. 
 
Only designated employers are compelled to implement affirmative action 
measures65 and only employees from designated groups as defined in the Act66 may 
benefit from affirmative action measures.  We will later revert to the definition of 
designated employers. 
 
Affirmative action programmes entered into outside the scope of the EEA may be 
used as justification, as long as they are consistent with the purpose of the Act.67 
 
3.3 DUTIES OF DESIGNATED EMPLOYERS 
 
In terms of section 1,68 a designated employer is: 
 
“(a) an employer who employs 50 or more employees; 
 
(b) an employer who employs fewer than 50 employees, but has an annual 
turnover that is equal or above the applicable annual turnover of small 
business in terms of Schedule 4 of the Act; 
                                                          
62  Minister of Finance & another v Van Heerden [2004] 12 BLLR 1181 (CC). 
63  Ibid. 
64. Du Plessis, Fouche, Jordaan and Van Wyk A Practical Guide to Labour Law 2nd ed (1996) 342. 
65  S 13(1) Act 55 of 1998. 
66  Act 55 of 1998. 
67  McGregor “The Nature of Affirmative Action: A Defence or a Right?” 428. 
68  Act 55 of 1998. 
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(c) a municipality, as referred to in Chapter 7 of the Constitution; 
 
(d) an organ of state as defined in section 239 of the Constitution, but 
excluding local spheres of government, the National Defence Force, the 
National Intelligence Agency and the South African Secret Service; and 
 
(e) an employer bound by a collective agreement in terms of section 23 or 
31 of the Labour Relations Act, which appoints him or her as a 
designated employer in terms of this Act, to the extent provided for in 
the agreement.” 
 
If the employer does not fall within any of the above listed categories, he or she 
cannot rely on the affirmative provisions in the EEA.  However, in terms of section 14 
of the EEA an employer may voluntarily indicate that he or she intends to comply with 
the Act.69 
 
As aforementioned, a designated employer must, in order to achieve employment 
equity, implement affirmative action measures for people from designated groups in 
terms of the EEA.  This entails consulting with employees;70 conducting an analysis 
of employment policies, practices,71 procedures and the “working environment” to 
identify “employment barriers”;72 preparation of an employment equity plan;73 and 
reporting to the Director-General on progress made in the implementation of the 
employment equity plan.74 
 
3.4 AFFIRMATIVE ACTION MEASURES 
 
Affirmative action measures are measures designed to ensure that suitably qualified 
people from designated groups have equal employment opportunities and are 
equitably represented in all occupational categories and levels in the workforce of a 
                                                          
69  Basson et al Essential Labour Law 235. 
70  S 16 Act 55 of 1998. 
71  “Employment policy or practice’ is widely defined as including recruitment procedures, 
advertising and selection criteria; the appointment process; job classification and grading; 
remuneration, employment benefits and terms and conditions of employment; the working 
environment and facilities; training and development; performance evaluation; promotion, 
transfer and demotion; disciplinary measures and dismissal.” 
72  S 19 Act 55 of 1998. 
73  S 20 Act 55 of 1998. 
74  S 21 Act 55 of 1998. 
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designated employer.75  For purposes of affirmative action measures, a person from 
a designated group may be suitably qualified for a job as a result of any one of, or 
any combination of that person’s: 76 
 
(a) formal qualifications; 
(b) prior learning, 
(c) relevant experience; or  
(d) capacity to acquire, within a reasonable time, the ability to do the job. 
 
When determining whether a person is suitably qualified for a job, an employer must 
review all these factors and determine whether that person has the ability to do the 
job in terms of any one of, or any combination of those factors.77  In making this 
determination an employer may not unfairly discriminate against a person solely on 
the grounds of that person's lack of relevant experience.78 
The EEA provides that the affirmative action measures designated employers are 
required to implement, must include:79 
 
“(a) measures to identify and eliminate employment barriers, including unfair 
discrimination, which adversely affect people from designated groups;80 
 
(b) measures designed to further diversity in the workplace based on equal dignity 
and respect of all people;81 
 
(c) making reasonable accommodation82 for people from designated groups in 
order to ensure that they enjoy equal opportunities and are equitably 
represented in the workforce of a designated employer;83 
 
(d) ensuring the equitable representation of suitably qualified people from 
designated groups in all occupational categories and levels in the workforce;84 
and 
                                                          
75  S 15(1) Act 55 of 1998. 
76  S 20(3) Act 55 1998. 
77  S 20(4) Act 55 1998. 
78  S 20(5) Act 55 1998. 
79  S 15(2) Act 55 1998. 
80  S 15(2)(a) Act 55 1998. 
81  S 15(2)(b) Act 55 1998. 
82  Reasonable accommodation according to s 1 means “any modification or adjustment to a job or 
to the working environment that will enable a person from a designated group to have access to 
or participate or advance in employment” 
83  S 15(2)(c) Act 55 1998. 
84  S 15(2)(d)(i) Act 55 of 1998. 
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(e) retaining and developing people from designated groups and implementing 
appropriate training measures.85  These measures include preferential 
treatment and numerical goals, but exclude quotas.86 
 
The Code of Good Practice (Preparation, implementation and monitoring of 
employment equity plans) gives further guidance about the affirmative action 
measures to be implemented by a designated employer to improve the under 
representation of designated group members.  The Code provides that these 
measures relate to, but are not limited to the following:87 
 
(a) Appointment of members from designated groups 
 
This would include transparent recruitment strategies such as appropriate and 
unbiased selection criteria and selection panels, and targeted advertising.88 
 
(b) Increasing the pool of available candidates 
 
Community investment and bridging programmes can increase the number of 
potential candidates.89 
 
(c) Training and development of people from designated groups 
 
These measures include access to training by members of designated groups, 
structured training and development programmes like learnerships and internships; 
on the job mentoring and coaching, and accelerated training for new recruits.  Where 
required, diversity training should be provided to responsible managers, as well as 
training in coaching and mentoring skills.90 
 
  
                                                          
85  S 15(2)(d)(ii) Act 55 of 1998. 
86  S 15(3) Act 55 1998. 
87  Item 8.3.1 of the Code of Good Practice. 
88  Ibid. 
89  Ibid. 
90  Ibid. 
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(d) Promotion of people from designated groups 
 
This could form part of structured succession and experience planning and would 
include appropriate and accelerated training.91 
 
(e) Retention of people from designated groups 
 
Retention strategies would include the promotion of a more diverse organizational 
culture; an interactive communication and feedback strategy; and ongoing labour 
turnover analysis.92 
 
(f) Reasonable accommodation for people from designated groups 
 
These measures include providing an enabling environment for disabled workers and 
workers with family responsibilities so that they may participate fully and, in so doing, 
improve productivity.  Examples of reasonable accommodation are accessible 
working areas, modifications to buildings and facilities, and flexible working hours 
where these can be accommodated.93 
 
(g) Steps to ensure that members of designated groups are appointed in 
such positions that they are able to meaningfully participate in 
corporate decision-making processes 
 
A conscious effort should be made to avoid all forms of tokenism.  Candidates must 
be appointed with commensurate degrees of authority.94 
 
(h) Steps to ensure that the corporate culture of the past is transformed in 
a way that affirms diversity in the workplace and harnesses the 
potential of all employees 
 
Such steps could include programmes for all staff, including management, 
contextualizing employment equity and sensitizing employees with regard to the 
                                                          
91  Item 8.3.1 of the Code of Good Practice. 
92  Ibid. 
93  Ibid. 
94  Ibid. 
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grounds of discrimination such as race, diversity, gender, disability, and religious 
accommodation.95 
 
(i) Any other measures arising out of the consultative process 
 
As previously discussed, a designated employer must, in order to achieve 
employment equity, implement affirmative action measures for people from 
designated groups in terms of the EEA.  This entails (1) consulting with the 
employees; (2) conducting an analysis; (3) preparing an employment equity plan; and 
(4) reporting to the Director-General on progress made in implementing the 
employment equity plan. 
 
Hereunder is a brief discussion of the aforementioned in order to enable a clear 
understanding of what is entailed in the term “affirmative action measures”. 
 
3.4.1 CONSULTATION WITH THE EMPLOYEES 
 
A designated employer must take reasonable steps to consult with representatives of 
employees representing the diverse interests of the workforce on the conducting of 
an analysis, preparation and implementation of a plan, and on reporting to the 
Director General.96 
 
3.4.2 DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION 
 
When a designated employer engages in consultation as aforementioned, that 
employer must disclose to the consulting parties all the relevant information that will 
allow those parties to consult effectively.97 
 
  
                                                          
95  Item 8.3.1 of the Code of Good Practice. 
96  S 16 & 17 Act 55 of 1998. 
97  S 18(1) Act 55 of 1998. 
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3.4.3 ANALYSIS 
 
In terms of section 19,98 a designated employer must collect information and conduct 
an analysis of its employment policies, practices, procedures and the working 
environment in order to identity employment barriers that adversely affect people 
from designated groups.  The aforementioned analysis must include a profile of the 
workforce within each occupational category and level to determine the degree of 
under-representation of people from designated groups.99 
 
3.4.4 EMPLOYMENT EQUITY PLAN 
 
A designated employer must prepare and implement an employment equity plan 
which will achieve reasonable progress towards employment equity in that 
employer’s workforce.100 
 
Section 20101 provides that the employment equity plan must state: 
 
“(a) the objectives to be achieved for each year of the plan; 
 
(b) the affirmative action measures to be implemented as required by section 
15(2); 
 
(c) the numerical goals to overcome under-representation at any occupational 
category and level; 
 
(d) the timetable for each year of the plan for the achievement of goals and 
objectives other than numerical goals; 
 
(e) the duration of the plan, which may not be shorter than one year or longer 
than five years; 
 
(f) the procedure that will be used to monitor and evaluate the implementation of 
the plan and whether reasonable progress is being made towards 
implementing employment equity; 
 
(g) the internal procedures to resolve any dispute about the interpretation or 
implementation of the plan; 
 
                                                          
98  Act 55 of 1998. 
99  Venter et al Labour Relations in South Africa 268. 
100  S 20(1) Act 55 of 1998. 
101  Act 55 of 1998. 
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(h) the persons in the workforce, including senior managers, responsible for 
monitoring and implementing the plan; and 
 
(i) any other prescribed matter.” 
 
The Employment Equity Amendment Act 47 of 2013 now allows for the Director-
General to apply to the Labour Court for the imposition of a fine should a designated 
employer fail to prepare or implement and employment equity plan.102 
 
3.4.5 REPORT 
 
A designated employer that employs fewer than 150 employees must submit a report 
to the Director-General within twelve months after the commencement of the Act,103 if 
later, within twelve months after the date on which the employer became a 
designated employer; and thereafter, submit a report to the Director-General once 
every two years, on the first working day of October.104 
 
A designated employer with more than 150 employees must submit his or her first 
report to the Director-General within six months of the commencement of the Act,105 
and a report every year thereafter in October.106  Details on such reports are 
prescribed in section 21 of the EEA. 
 
The Employment Equity Amendment Act 47 of 2013 provides a fairly significant 
overhaul of section 21.  A designated employer is now required to submit an annual 
report (as opposed to one report every two years).  An employer who becomes a 
designated employer after the first working day of April but before the first working 
day of October is required to submit his or her first report on the first working day of 
October of the following year.  An employer who is unable to submit a plan in terms 
of the prescribed dates must notify the Director-General of his or her inability to do so 
– with reasons – by the last working day of August.  Moreover, the Amendment Act 
now allows he Director-General to apply to the Labour Court to impose a fine if (a) an 
                                                          
102  Venter et al Labour Relations in South Africa 269. 
103  Act 55 of 1998. 
104  S 21(1) Act 55 of 1998. 
105  Act 55 of 1998. 
106  Venter et al Labour Relations in South Africa 269. 
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employer fails to submit a report; (b) he or she fails to notify the Director-General of 
his or her inability to submit; or (c) the reasons provided for this inability to submit are 
invalid or false.107 
 
3.4.6 PUBLICATION OF REPORT 
 
Every designated employer that is a public company must publish a summary of the 
report required by section 21 in that employer’s annual financial report.108  Organs of 
the state must table their reports in Parliament.109 
 
3.4.7 SUCCESSIVE EMPLOYMENT EQUITY PLANS 
 
Before the end of term of its current employment equity plan, a designated employer 
must prepare a subsequent employment equity plan.110 
 
3.4.8 RESPONSIBILITY FOR MONITORING AND IMPLEMENTATION 
 
In terms of section 24111 every designated employer must assign one or more senior 
managers to take responsibility for monitoring and implementing an employment 
equity plan.  They must be accorded the authority and means to do this.  The 
employer must further take reasonable steps to ensure that the managers perform 
these functions.112 
 
It is crucial to take note that the assignment of responsibility to a manager does not 
relieve he designated employer of any duty imposed by the EEA.113 
 
  
                                                          
107  Ibid. 
108  S 22(1) Act 55 of 1998. 
109  S 22(2) Act 55 of 1998. 
110  S 23 Act 55 of 1998. 
111  Act 55 of 1998. 
112  Venter et al Labour Relations in South Africa 269. 
113  S 24(2) Act 55 of 1998. 
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3.4.9 DUTY TO INFORM 
 
An employer must display in a prominent and accessible place in the workplace a 
summary of the provisions of the Act,114 and a copy of the most recent employment 
equity report submitted to the Director-General.115 
 
3.4.10 INCOME DIFFERENTIALS 
 
A designated employer must submit to the Employment Conditions Commission 
(hereinafter referred to as “the ECC”) a statement of the remuneration and the 
benefits received in each occupational category and level of the workforce.  Where 
the income differentials are deemed disproportionate, measures must be taken by 
the employer in accordance with the guidelines to be issued by the Minister to reduce 
the extent of the disproportion.  Such measures may include collective bargaining or 
application of the benchmarks as supplied by the ECC.116 
 
3.4.11 COMMISSION FOR EMPLOYMENT EQUITY 
 
The Commission for Employment Equity has been established to advise the Minister 
of Labour and policies, codes of good practice, regulation and policy.  It may also 
make awards, conduct research, and report to the Minister on matters relating to the 
Act.117 
 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
 
Not everyone benefits from affirmative measures.  According to section 9(2) of the 
Constitution, the beneficiaries of affirmative action measures may be “persons or 
categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination”.  According to section 
2(b) of the EEA, the goal of affirmative action is that “affirmative action measures” 
should be taken by “designated employers” to ensure the “equitable representation” 
                                                          
114  Act 55 of 1998. 
115 S 25 Act 55 of 1998. 
116  Venter et al Labour Relations in South Africa 270. 
117  Ibid. 
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of “suitably qualified” persons from the “designated groups” in all occupational 
categories and levels at workplace. 
 
Affirmative action measures are dependent on occurrence of unfair discrimination.   
 
It is evident in this study that there are indeed affirmative action measures designed 
to achieve the primary object of affirmative action.  It further transpired that the Code 
of Good Practice: Preparation, Implementation and Monitoring of Employment Equity 
Plans also gives further guidance about affirmative action measures to be 
implemented by a designated employer.  Both the employee and designated 
employer have a vital role to play. 
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CHAPTER 4 
PROGRAMMATIC ENFORCEMENT OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN 
TERMS OF THE EMPLOYMENT EQUITY ACT 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the biggest dilemmas that South Africa’s young democracy has faced since 
its inception is the redistribution and the enforcement of affirmative action that must 
inevitably be balanced with the constitutional imperative of nation building and the 
fundamental rights of every South African citizen.118 
 
The heated debate that has been raging between supporters and opponents of the 
current affirmative action model over the past decade is still mounting intensity as 
increasing emphasis is placed on race and ethnicity as a result of the political and 
socio-economic effects of the current model.  Affirmative action is fuelling racial 
tension and the polarisation and alienation of groups in South Africa, which the 
country, given its stormy history, can hardly afford.119 
 
Despite the conflicting views of affirmative action in its entirety, the ideals behind the 
enforcement of affirmative action in the workplace in South Africa, post-1994, are 
sound and understandable; however, there have been so many challenges to 
overcome to ensure that the empowerment of the previously disadvantaged does not 
defeat the constitutional right to equality.120 
 
Owing to the aforementioned and in an attempt to develop an understanding as to 
the programmatic enforcement of affirmative action, as a point of departure, this 
Chapter will focus primarily on the enforcement measures derived from the EEA.  
Upon discussing same, it will transpire that the EEA empowers labour inspectors to 
monitor compliance, investigate complaints and enforce compliance. 
 
                                                          
118  Hermann Rectifying Affirmative Action (2010) 1. 
119  Ibid. 
120  http://www.golegal.co.za/courts/fairs-fair-applying-affirmative-action (31/12/2014). 
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Compliance is enforced though compliance orders.  It will further transpire that there 
are certain limitations applicable to the issuing of compliance orders.  In addition to 
the aforementioned, it will further be evident that a designated employer can object to 
a compliance order and appeal same.  In all this, the employer, notwithstanding the 
aforesaid, has a further recourse to an administration review action against the 
inspector.  Furthermore, adequate penalties are provided for the contravention of the 
Act.121 
 
Subsequently, this Chapter will focus on the assessment of compliance.  It will also 
come to light that the Labour Court plays a vital role in the enforcement of affirmative 
action measures.  Thereafter, the Chapter will concentrate on the protection of 
employee rights and the state contracts; in particular; how they influence 
enforcement of the Act 122 
 
In addition to the aforesaid, this Chapter will shift attention to the temporary 
employment services and the consequences of obstruction, undue influence and 
fraud in relation to compliance with the Act.123 
 
Moreover, this Chapter will observe the Employment Equity Amendment Act 47 of 
2013 and the influence thereof in the enforcement of affirmative action measures. 
 
4.2 ENFORCEMENT IN TERMS OF THE EEA 
 
4.2.1 MONITORING BY EMPLOYEES AND TRADE UNION 
REPRESENTATIVES 
 
The first level of policing is the workplace itself.  Any employee may bring alleged 
contravention of the Act124 to the attention of the employer; another employee; any 
trade union; a workplace forum; a labour inspector; the Director-General or the 
Commission.125 
                                                          
121  Act 55 of 1998. 
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123  Ibid. 
124  Ibid. 
125  S 34 Act 55 of 1998, 
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4.2.2 ENFORCEMENT BY LABOUR INSPECTORS 
 
Labour inspectors acting in terms of the EEA have the authority to enter, question 
and inspect as provided for in section 65126 and 66127 of the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act.128 
 
  
                                                          
126  65  Power of entry 
“(1) In order to monitor and enforce compliance with an employment law, a labour inspector 
may, without warrant or notice, at any reasonable time, enter – 
(a) any premises or any other place where an employer carries on business or keeps 
any employment records, that is not a home; 
(b) … 
(c) … 
(2) A labour inspector may enter a home or any place other than a place referred to in 
subsection (1) only – 
(a) with written consent of the owner or occupier; or 
(b) if authorized to do so in writing in terms of subsection (3). 
(3) The Labour Court may issue an authorization contemplated in subsection (2) only on 
written application by a labour inspector who states under oath or affirmation the reasons 
for the need to enter a place in order to monitor or enforce compliance with any 
employment law. 
(4) If it is practical to do so, the employer and a trade union representative must be notified 
that the labour inspector is present at a workplace and of the reason for the inspection.” 
127  66  Powers to question and inspect 
“(1) In order to monitor or enforce compliance with an employment law, a labour inspector 
may – 
(a) require a person to disclose information, either orally or in writing, and either alone 
or in the presence of witnesses, on any matter to which an employment law 
relates, and require that the disclosure be made under oath or affirmation; 
(b) inspect, and question a person about, any record or document to which an 
employment law relates; 
(c) copy any record or document referred to in paragraph (b), or remove these to 
make copies or extracts; 
(d) require a person to produce or deliver to a place specified by the labour inspector 
any record or document referred to in paragraph (b) for inspection; 
(e) inspect, question a person about, and if necessary remove, any article, substance 
or machinery present at a place referred to in section 65; 
(f) inspect or question a person about any work performed; and 
(g) perform any other prescribed function necessary for monitoring or enforcing 
compliance with an employment law.” 
128  Act 75 of 997. 
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4.2.3 UNDERTAKING BY DESIGNATED EMPLOYER TO COMPLY 
 
A labour inspector must request and obtain a written undertaking from a designated 
employer to comply with paragraphs (a) to (j) within a specified period, if the 
inspector has reasonable grounds to believe that the employer has failed to:129 
 
“(a) consult with the employees as required by section 16; 
 
(b) conduct an analysis as required by section 19; 
 
(c) prepare an employment equity plan as required by section 20; 
 
(d) implement its employment equity plan; 
 
(e) submit an annual report as required by section 21; 
 
(f) publish a report as required by section 22; 
 
(g) prepare a successive employment equity plan as required by section 23; 
 
(h) assign responsibility to one or more senior managers as required by section 24; 
 
(i) inform the employees as required by section 25; or 
 
(j) keep records as required by section 26.” 
 
A copy of a written undertaking (form EEA5) is attached hereto as ANNEXURE “A” 
for ease reference. 
 
The purpose of the aforementioned form is to record an undertaking by the employer 
to comply with section 36 of the EEA.  The employer, assisted by the labour 
inspector, completes the form.  Upon completion thereof, the form goes to the labour 
inspector.  Failure to comply with the undertaking will result in a compliance order 
being issued. 
 
4.2.4 COMPLIANCE ORDER 
 
The labour inspector may issue a compliance order to a designated employer if that 
employer has refused to give a written undertaking in terms of section 36 when 
                                                          
129  S 36 Act 55 of 1998. 
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requested to do so; or failed to comply with the written undertaking given in terms of 
section 36.130 
 
A compliance order issued must set out:131 
 
“(a) the name of the employer, and the workplaces to which the order applies; 
 
(b) the provisions of Chapter III of this Act which the employer has not complied with and 
the details of the conduct constituting non-compliance; 
 
(c) any written undertaking given by the employer in terms of section 36 and any failure 
by the employer to comply with the written undertaking; 
 
(d) any steps that the employer must take and the period within which those steps must 
be taken; 
 
(e) the maximum fine, if any, that may be imposed on the employer in terms of Schedule 
1 for failing to comply with the order; and 
 
(f) any other prescribed information.” 
 
A labour inspector who issues a compliance order must serve a copy of that order on 
the employer named in it.132  Upon receiving the aforementioned compliance order, 
the designated employer must display a copy of that order prominently at a place 
accessible to the affected employees at each workplace named in it.133  The 
designated employer must comply with the compliance order within the time period 
stated in it, unless the employer objects that order in terms of section 39134 as 
discussed hereunder.135  If a designated employer does not comply with an order 
within the period stated in it, or does not object to that order in terms of section 39,136 
the Director-General may apply to the Labour Court to make the compliance order 
and order of the Labour Court. 
 
A copy of a compliance order (form EEA6) is attached hereto as ANNEXURE “B” for 
ease reference. 
                                                          
130  S 37 Act 55 of 1998. 
131  S 37(2) Act 55 of 1998. 
132  S 37(3) Act 55 of 1998. 
133  S 37(4) Act 55 of 1998. 
134  Act 55 of 1998. 
135  S 37(5) Act 55 of 1998. 
136  Act 55 of 1998. 
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The purpose of the aforementioned form is to enforce compliance relating to section 
36 of the EEA.  The inspector completes the form.  Upon completion thereof, the 
form goes to the employer.  Failure to comply with a compliance order could result in 
a referral to Labour Court. 
 
4.2.4.1 LIMITATIONS RELATING TO COMPLIANCE ORDERS 
 
A labour inspector may not issue a compliance order in respect of failure to comply 
with a provision in Chapter III of the EEA if the employer is being reviewed by the 
Director-General in terms of section 43;137 or the Director-General has referred the 
employer’s failure to comply with a recommendation to the Labour Court in terms of 
section 45.138 
 
4.2.5 OBJECTION AGAINST A COMPLIANCE ORDER 
 
A designated employer may object to a compliance order by making written 
representation to the Director-General within twenty one days after receiving that 
order.139  If the employer shows good cause at any time, the Director-General may 
permit the employer to object after the period of twenty one days have expired.140 
 
                                                          
137  “(1) A Director-Genera may conduct a review to determine whether an employer is complying 
with this Act. 
 (2) In order to conduct the review the Director-General may- 
(a) request an employer to submit to the Director-General a copy of its current analysis 
or employment equity plan; 
(b) request an employer to submit to the Director-General any book, record, 
correspondence, document or information that could reasonably be relevant to the 
review of the employer’s compliance with this Act; 
(c) request a meeting with an employer to discuss its employment equity plan, the 
implementation of its plan and any matters related to its compliance with this Act; 
or 
(d) request a meeting with any – 
(i) employee or trade union consulted in terms of section 16; 
(ii) workplace forum; or 
(iii) other persons who may have information relevant to the review.” 
138  “If an employer fails to comply with a request made by the Director-General in terms of section 
43(2) or a recommendation made by the Director-General in terms of section 44 (b), the 
Director-General may refer the employer’s non-compliance to the Labour Court.” 
139  S 39(1) Act 55 of 1998. 
140  S 39(2) Act 55 of 1998. 
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After considering the designated employer’s representations and any other relevant 
information, the Director-General may confirm, vary or cancel all or any part of the 
order to which the employer objected; and must specify the time period within which 
that employer must comply with any part of the order that is confirmed or varied.141 
 
Upon making the aforementioned decision and within sixty days after receiving the 
employer’s representations, the Director-General must serve a copy of that decision 
on that employer. 142  A designated employer who receives an order of the Director-
General must either comply with that order within the time period stated in it; or 
appeal against that order to the Labour Court in terms of section 40.143  If a 
designated employer does not comply with an order of the Director-General, or does 
not appeal against that order, the Director-General may apply to the Labour Court for 
that order to be made and order of the Labour Court.144 
 
A copy of a notice of objection against a compliance order in terms of section 39 of 
the EEA (form EEA7) is attached hereto as ANNEXURE “C” for ease reference. 
 
The purpose of the aforementioned is for a designated employer to lodge an 
objection to a compliance order.  The employer must complete the form.  Upon 
completion thereof, the form goes to the Provincial Office of the Department from 
which the compliance order was issued.  A copy must be delivered to the 
employee(s) affected by it, or if this is impractical, to a representative of the 
employee(s), including a registered trade union. 
 
4.2.6 APPEAL FROM COMPLIANCE ORDER 
 
A designated employer may appeal to the Labour Court against a compliance order 
of the Director-General within twenty one days after receiving that order.145  The 
Labour Court may at any time permit the employer to appeal after the twenty one-day 
                                                          
141  S 39(3) Act 55 of 1998. 
142  S 39(4) Act 55 of 1998. 
143  S 39(5) Act 55 of 1998. 
144  S 39(6) Act 55 of 1998. 
145  S 40(1) Act 55 of 1998. 
 37 
time limit has expired, if that employer shows good cause for failing to appeal within 
that time limit.146 
 
If the designated employer has appealed against an order of the Director-General, 
that order is suspended until the final determination of the appeal by the Labour 
Court; or any appeal against the decision of the Labour Court in the matter.147 
 
4.2.7 REGISTER OF DESIGNATED EMPLOYERS 
 
In terms of section 41 of the EEA, the Minister must keep a register of designated 
employers that have submitted the reports required by section 21.148  The 
aforementioned register is a public document. 
 
4.2.8 ASSESSMENT OF COMPLIANCE 
 
In determining whether a designated employer is implementing employment equity 
plan in compliance with the EEA, the Director-General or any other person or body 
applying the EEA must, in addition to the factors stated in section 15,149 take into 
account all of the following: 
 
“(a) the extent to which designated groups are representative of the demographic 
profile of the national and regional economically active population; 
 
(b) the pool of suitably qualified candidates from which the employer can select; 
 
(c) relevant economic and financial factors; 
 
(d) the economic circumstances of the employer; and 
 
(e) the number of present and planned vacancies at different levels in the organisation, 
 
(f) progress made in implementing employment equity by other designated employers 
operating under comparable circumstances and within the same sector; 
 
(g) reasonable efforts made by a designated employer to implement its employment 
equity plan; 
                                                          
146  S 40(2) Act 55 of 1998. 
147  S 40(3) Act 55 of 1998. 
148  Act 55 of 1998. 
149  Ibid. 
 38 
 
(h) the extent to which the designated employer has made progress in eliminating 
employment barriers that adversely affect people from designated groups; and 
 
(i) any other prescribed factor.” 
 
4.2.9 LABOUR COURT 
 
In terms of section 50,150 the Labour Court may make any order it deems fit and 
equitable, and may order the employer to take steps to prevent the same unfair 
discrimination or similar practice occurring in the future, or may order the payment of 
damages or compensation to the employee.  The maximum permissible fines that 
may be imposed for contravening the Act151 are set out in Schedule 1 of the latter. 
 
Any contravention of section 16, 19, 20, 21 and 23 of the Act152 (affirmative action 
provisions) may lead up to a fine of up to R500,000 on no previous contravention, 
and a maximum fine of up to R900,000 on four previous contraventions in respect of 
the same provision within three years. 
 
4.2.10 PROTECTION OF EMPLOYEE RIGHTS 
 
Section 51153 provides general protection to employees.  The aforementioned has a 
positive impact on enforcement of measures, including affirmative action, provided by 
the EEA.  In terms of the latter section, no person may prevent an employee from 
exercising any right conferred by the EEA or from participating in any proceedings in 
terms of the latter. 
 
Furthermore, no person may favour an employee in exchange of that employee not 
exercising any right conferred by the EEA or not participating in any proceedings in 
terms of the latter.154  In other words, an employer cannot prevent an employee from 
                                                          
150  Act 55 of 1998. 
151  Ibid. 
152  Ibid. 
153  Act 55 of 1998. 
154  S 51(3) Act 55 of 1998. 
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bringing an alleged contravention of the EEA.  Such contravention may be failure on 
the employer in effecting affirmative action measures. 
 
4.2.11 STATE CONTRACTS 
 
Section 53 of the EEA provides that: 
 
“(1) Every employer that makes an offer to conclude an agreement with any organ 
of state for the furnishing of supplies or services to that organ of state or for 
the hiring or letting of anything – 
 
must – 
 
(i) if it is a designated employer, comply with Chapter II and III of this Act; or 
(ii) … 
 
attach to that offer either – 
 
(i) a certificate in terms of subsection (2) which is conclusive evidence that the 
employer complies with the relevant Chapters of this Act; 
 
(ii) a declaration by the employer that it complies with the relevant Chapters of this 
Act, which, when verified by the Director-General, is conclusive evidence of 
compliance. 
 
(2) An employer referred to in subsection (1) may request a certificate from the 
Minister confirming its compliance with Chapter II, or Chapter II and III, as the 
case may be. 
 
(3) A certificate issued in terms of subsection (2) is valid for twelve months from the 
date of issue until the next date on which the employer is obliged to submit a 
report in terms of section 21, whichever the period is the longer. 
 
(4) A failure to comply with the relevant provisions of this Act is sufficient ground for 
rejection of any offer to conclude an agreement referred to in subsection (1) of for 
the cancellation of the agreement.” 
 
As evident in the aforementioned provision, state contracts also act as primary 
drivers of affirmative action and measures thereof.  There are prescribed rules and 
regulation which an employer has to comply with prior being able to conclude an 
agreement referred to in the above provision.  No employer should conclude an 
agreement with an organ of a state to supply services if not compliant with Chapters 
II and III of the EEA. 
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4.2.12 TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT SERVICES 
 
For the purposes of Chapter III155 (Affirmative action), a person whose services have 
been procured for, or provided to, a client by a temporary employment service is 
deemed to be the employee of that client, where that person’s employment with the 
client is not indefinite duration or for a period of three months or longer.156 
 
Where a temporary employment service, on express or implied instructions of a 
client, commits an act of unfair discrimination, both the temporary employment 
service and the client are jointly and severally liable.157 
 
4.2.13 OBSTRUCTION, UNDUE INFLUENCE AND FRAUD 
 
Another enforcement measure derived from the EEA is expressly provided in section 
61 thereof.  In terms of the latter: 
 
“(1) No person may – 
 
(a) exercising obstruct or attempt to improperly influence any person who is 
a power or performing a function in terms of this Act; or 
 
(b) knowingly give false information in any document or information 
provided to the Director-General or labour inspector in terms of this Act. 
 
(2) No employer may knowingly take any measures to avoid becoming a 
designated employer. 
 
(3) A person who contravenes a provision of this section commits an offence and 
may be sentenced to a fine not exceeding R10,000.” 
 
As evident from the aforesaid, the duty to implement affirmative action falls upon 
“designated employers”.  In order to enforce affirmative action measures, the above-
mentioned provision drives towards preventing employers from taking any measures 
to avoid being a “designated employers”.  Most employers attempt to classify 
themselves as ordinary employers in order to evade the duty of implementing 
affirmative action measures and owing to the aforementioned provision, such 
                                                          
155  Act 55 of 1998. 
156  S 57(1) Act 55 of 1998. 
157  S 57(2) Act 55 of 1998. 
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conduct is prohibited.  The latter provision therefore plays a vital role in the 
enforcement of affirmative action. 
 
4.2.14 EMPLOYMENT EQUITY AMENDMENT ACT 47 OF 2013 
 
The Employment Equity Amendment Act 47 of 2013 addresses the issue of 
compliance in number of ways.  Less empathically, a labour inspector may now 
obtain a written undertaking to comply from an employer in the following areas 
only:158 
 
“(a) failure to consult with the employees; 
 
(b) failure to conduct an analysis of its work context and environment in order to 
identify barriers; 
 
(c) failure to publish an employment equity report; and 
 
(d) failure to assign responsibility to a manager, inform his or her employees, and 
keep records in terms of section 24-26 of the EEA.” 
 
In terms of section 37,159 as discussed previously, a labour inspector may 
accordingly issue a compliance order to an employer failing to comply with any of the 
above. 
 
Employers may no longer appeal against the compliance order in terms of section 39 
and 40 of the EEA, as these are now repealed.160 
 
In order to assess compliance in terms of section 42,161 a labour inspector will only 
consider the extent to which suitably qualified people from designated groups are 
representative of the demographic profile of the national and the regional 
economically active population.162 
 
                                                          
158  Venter et al Labour Relations in South Africa 270. 
159  Act 55 of 1998. 
160  Venter et al Labour Relations in South Africa 271. 
161  Act 55 of 1998. 
162  Venter et al Labour Relations in South Africa 271. 
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Furthermore, the Employment Equity Amendment Act 47 of 2013 amends section 
45163 such that the Director-General may petition the Labour Court to impose a fine 
on an employer for failing to justify non-compliance.  An employer may notify the 
Director-General in writing that it does not accept either a request or a 
recommendation, in which case the Director-General has ninety days in which to 
institute proceedings in the Labour Court in case of a request, and one hundred and 
eighty days in case of a recommendation.  Failure to do so will result in the request 
or recommendation lapsing.164 
 
Moreover, in terms of the Employment Amendment Act 47 of 2013, a fine payable in 
terms of section 50165 is to be paid to the National Revenue Fund as per section 213 
of the Constitution.166  Fines are also amended as follows:167 
 
“(g) any contravention of sections 19, 22, 24, 25, 26 and 43(2)168 may lead to a 
fine of R1,500,000 where there has been no previous contraventions, and up 
to R2,700,000 where there has been four previous contraventions; and 
 
(h) for section 20, 21, 23 and 44(b), an employer may incur a fine of the greater of 
R1,500,000 or 2% of its turnover where there has been no previous 
contravention, and up to the greater of R2,700,0000 or 10% of its turnover 
where there have been four previous contraventions.” 
 
The Employment Equity Amendment Act 47 of 2013 further adds to section 53169 by 
suggesting that the Minister may in the Code of Good Practice set out factors to be 
taken into account when assessing whether an employer complies with Chapters II 
and III of the EEA.170 
 
  
                                                          
163  Act 55 of 1998. 
164  Venter et al Labour Relations in South Africa 271 
165 Act 55 of 1998. 
166  Venter et al Labour Relations in South Africa 271. 
167  Ibid. 
168  Act 55 of 1998 
169  Act 55 of 1998. 
170  Venter at al Labour Relations in South Africa 272. 
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4.3 CONCLUSION 
 
The legal position regarding the enforcement of affirmative action in terms of the EEA 
is sound and understandable.  The enforcement measures afforded by the EEA are 
not complex in nature as illustrated in the cycle contained in Figure 1 hereunder. 
 
The main issues is whether or not employees are exposed to such enforcement 
measures.  As reflected above herein, state contracts also play a sustainable role in 
influencing the enforcement of compliance with the measures contained in the Act.171 
 
In addition to the aforementioned, as previously discussed, the EEA, in entrenching 
enforcement thereof, further contains a provision which prevents obstruction, undue 
influence and fraudulent conduct relating to implementation of the Act.172 
 
Moreover, the Employment Equity Amendment Act 47 of 2013 also introduced some 
changes which have an impact on the enforcement of affirmative action provided by 
the EEA.  It is clear and evident that the EEA does provide for a programmatic 
enforcement of affirmative action.   
 
                                                          
171  Ibid. 
172  Ibid. 
 44 
Allege contravention of EEA?
Employee or trade union rep 
may bring an alleged 
contravention to the attention 
another employee; an 
employer; trade union ...
(s34)
Inspector may enter, question 
and inspect premises of the 
employer
(s35)
If inspector has reasonable 
grounds to believe that the 
employer has failed to comply 
with s16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 
24, 25 or 26 = may request 
and obtain a written 
undertakin (s36)
Employer refusing to give 
written undertaking or failed 
to comply with written 
undertaking? = Inspector may 
issue compliance order
(s37)
Compliance order may not be 
issued if the employer is being 
reviewed by the Director -
General or failure has been 
referred to the Labour Court 
by the Director-General with a 
recommendation
(s38)
Employer can object to 
copliance order within 21 days 
after receiving the order. Late 
objections can be condoned 
on good cause shown (s39)
Employer can appeal from 
compliance order to the 
Labour Court against a 
compliance order of the 
Director-General within 21 
days. Late appeals can be 
condoned on good cause 
shown (s40)
Assessment of compliance by 
the Director - General (s42)
Director-General may conduct 
a review to determine 
whether the employer is 
complying with the Act (s43)
Recommendation by Director-
General (s45)
Labour court adjudication 
(s50)
FLOW CHART DIAGRAM: ENFORCEMENT OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
MEASURES IN TERMS OF THE EEA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1 
  
 45 
CHAPTER 5 
THE INFLUENCE OF HARMSE v CITY OF CAPE TOWN (2003) 24 ILJ 
1130 (LC) ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE RIGHT OF JOB 
CANDIDATES 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Applicants face extreme hurdles in successfully pursuing a claim underlying the 
procedure of unfair discrimination.173  However, the court provides some insight into 
what essential allegations should be made by an applicant to support a discrimination 
claim.174  The aforementioned insight is provided in the case of Harmse v City of 
Cape Town.175  The judge’s remarks relating to the absence of a difference between 
direct and indirect discrimination claims are of particular importance in the 
abovementioned case and will be discussed hereunder.176  However, before 
embarking on the judge’s remarks, the background of the decision needs to be 
discussed. 
 
5.2  BACKGROUND TO THE DECISION 
 
Mr Jacobus Johannes Petrus Harmse (hereinafter referred to as “Harmse”), a “black 
person” referred as dispute with City of Cape Town (hereinafter referred to as “the 
employer”) by a way of a statement of claim.  In his statement of claim, he alleged 
that the decision of his employer not to shortlist him for any of the three posts to 
which he applied constituted unfair discrimination.   
 
This unfair discrimination, according to Harmse, was prohibited by section 6177 of the 
EEA. 
                                                          
173  Gerbers “The Right of Job Candidate to Affirmative Action Seclection: A Landmark Case? Vol 
12 No 10 (May 2003) Contemporary Labour Law 91. 
174  Gerbers “The Right of a Job Candidate to Affirmative Action Selection: A Landmark Case?  92. 
175  Gerbers “The Right of a Job Candidate to Affirmative Action Selection: A Landmark Case?  91-
92. 
176  Gerbers “The Right of a Job Candidate to Affirmative Action Selection: A Landmark Case?” 92. 
177  “(1) No person may unfairly discriminate, either directly or indirectly, against an employee, in 
any employment policy or practice, on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, 
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The grounds upon which Harmse alleged that he was discriminated against are as 
follows:178 
 
(i) race; 
(ii) political belief; 
(iii) lack of relevant experience; and/or 
(iv) other arbitrary grounds. 
 
Harmse further alleged that the employer unlawfully discriminated against him by 
failing, in considering his application for shortlisting, to apply certain subsections of 
section 20 of the EEA.  The employer reacted to this by raising exception 
proceedings against the statement of claim on a number of grounds.  The 
aforementioned grounds relied upon by the employer fell into two categories:179 
 
(i) the statement of claim was vague and embarrassing; and 
 
(ii) the statement of claim lacked averments that were necessary to sustain the 
action. 
 
Hermes’s statement of claim, as required by Rule 6180 of the Labour Court 
(hereinafter referred to as “the LC”), reflected what purported to be a clear and 
concise statement of the material facts and legal issues relating to his claim.181 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
pregnancy, marital status, family responsibility, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, 
age, disability, religion, HIV status, belief, political opinion, culture, language or birth.” 
178  (2003) 24 ILJ 1130 (LC). 
179  Ibid. 
180  “..a document initiating proceedings, known as a ‘statement of claim’…must have a substantive 
part containing the following information: 
(i) The names, description and addresses of the parties; 
(ii) A clear and concise statement of the material facts, in chronological order, on which the 
party relies, which statement must be sufficiently particular to enable any opposing party 
to reply to the document; 
(iii) A clear and concise statement of the legal issues that arise from the material facts, which 
statement must be sufficiently particular to enable any opposing party to reply to the 
document; and 
(iv) The relief sought.” 
181  Garbers “The Right of a Job Candidate to Affirmative Action Selection: A Landmark Case?  92; 
Harmse v City of Cape Town [2003] 6 BLLR 557 (LC) 558. 
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In terms of the LC, a statement of claim serves a dual purpose.  The one purpose is 
to bring a respondent before the Court in order to respond to the claims made 
against it.  The second purpose is to inform the respondent of the material facts and 
the legal issues arising from those facts upon which the applicant will rely to succeed 
in its claims.182 
 
The material facts and the legal issues must be sufficiently detailed to enable the 
respondent to respond, that is, that the respondent must be informed of the nature or 
essence of the dispute with sufficient and legal particularity so that it knows what it is 
that the applicant is relying upon to succeed in its claim.183  In other words, the 
respondent must be informed of the nature and essence of the dispute with sufficient 
factual and legal particularity so that it knows what it is that the applicant is relying 
upon to succeed in its claim.184 
 
The LC held that the rules of the Court do not require an elaborate exposition of all 
facts in their full and complex detail.185  Ordinarily, that is the role of evidence, 
whether oral or documentary.186  There is a clear distinction between the role played 
by evidence and that played by pleadings. 
 
The pleadings simply give the architecture; the detail and the texture of the factual 
dispute are provided at the trial.187  
 
The pre-trial conference provides an occasion for the detail or texture of the factual 
disputes to begin to take shape.188  Accordingly the rules of the Court anticipated that 
the relief claimed might not have been precisely pleaded in the statement of claim 
filed.  Furthermore, the rules of the Court anticipated that the factual matters at issue 
will be dealt with more fully and precisely in the pre-trial conference. 
                                                          
182. (2003) 24 ILJ 1130 (LC). 
183  Ibid. 
184  Ibid. 
185  Ibid. 
186  Ibid. 
187  Ibid. 
188  Ibid. 
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The rules therefore anticipate that the parties at the pre-trial conference will have 
dealt in much more detail, not only with the factual matters, but also the legal 
issues.189 
 
According to the LC, the statement of claim and response thereto foreshadows this 
activity but is not a substitute for it.190 
 
The LC stated that when an exception is raised against a statement of claim, it must 
consider, having regard to what is stated above, whether the matter presents a 
question to be decided which, at this stage, will dispose of the case in whole or in 
part.  If not, then the Court must consider whether there is any embarrassment that is 
real and that cannot be met by making amendments or providing of particulars at  the 
pre-trial conference stage.191 
 
The exceptions of the employer were determined against the aforementioned 
background. 
 
5.2.1 FIRST OBJECTION 
 
The first objection raised by the employer was that the applicant was not properly 
before the Court because he did refer the dispute to conciliation.  This meritless 
objection was withdrawn.192 
 
5.2.2 SECOND OBJECTION 
 
The second ground of exception related to the issue or “race”.  The employer argued 
that if an employee claims unfair discrimination on the grounds of race when applying 
for an advertised post, then such an employee’s essential averments must include 
certain issues.193 
                                                          
189  (2003) 24 ILJ 1130 (LC). 
190  Ibid. 
191  Ibid. 
192  Ibid. 
193  “…must include:  
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The employer alleged that Hermes’s failed to make the essential averments and 
owing to the latter Hermes’s statement of claim failed to disclose a cause of action 
based on race or was vague and embarrassing.194 
 
The LC first dealt with the allegation that the statement of claim195 fails to disclose a 
cause of action of unfair discrimination based on “race”. 
 
It was evident in Hermes’s statement of claim that he claimed he was not shortlisted 
because he is a black person. 
 
Furthermore, his statement of claim specifically stated that the decision of the 
employer not to shortlist him for any of the three post constituted unfair discrimination 
as per section 6 of the EEA on the basis of race.196  Harmse indeed alleged unfair 
discrimination on the grounds of race. 
 
The employer further claimed that even if it is unfair discrimination that is alleged, a 
party before the Court must expressly state whether they allege direct or indirect 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(a) that the employee would have been shortlisted but for the fact that s/he is a black person; 
(b) that the other (specified) persons, who were not black, were shortlisted because they 
were not black; 
(c) an identification of the act of discrimination as either direct or indirect discrimination; and 
(d) material facts relied on by the applicant in support of his/her allegations with sufficient 
particularity to enable the respondent to respond.” 
194  (2003) 24 ILJ 1130 (LC). 
195  In the statement of claim, the applicant pleaded that: 
1. he is an employee; 
2. he is in the employ of the respondent; 
3. he is back as defined in the EEA; 
4. during August or September 2001, the respondent advertised a post for strategic 
executive directors; 
5. the respondent informed all employees that the appointment process would comply with 
the EEA; 
6. the respondent failed to shortlist him for any of the three posts for which he applied; 
7. he sought reasons for the respondent’s failure to shortlist him; 
8. the reasons furnished by the respondent for failing to shortlist him were not credible and 
that this gives rise to a necessary inference that other unstated factors must have been 
decisive; 
9. the respondent appointed white males to two of the three advertised posts; 
10. the respondent’s decision not to shortlist him constitutes unfair discrimination against him 
on the ground of race. 
196  (2003) 24 ILJ 1130 (LC). 
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discrimination.  The LC held that it cannot be said that the statement of clam, on 
account of the absence of an express identification of the alleged discrimination as 
“direct” or “indirect” discloses no cause of action.197 
 
Consequently, the employer’s objection that the applicant had failed to disclose a 
cause of action based on race discrimination was dismissed.198 
 
5.2.3 THIRD OBJECTION 
 
The employer’s further exception was that the applicant’s statement of claim in so far 
as race discrimination is concerned was vague and embarrassing.  The employer’s 
complaint was that it cannot respond to the statement of claim without knowing 
whether Harmse was alleging “direct” or “indirect” discrimination.199 
 
The Court held that the difference between “direct” and “indirect” discrimination lies in 
that which must be proved at trial.  A respondent’s defence to an unfair direct 
discrimination claim is no different to an unfair indirect discrimination claim.  For the 
latter reason, the employer’s claim that Hermes’s statement of claim in so far as ace 
discrimination is concerned was vague and embarrassing was dismissed.200 
 
5.2.4 FOURTH OBJECTION 
 
The employer further argued that Harmse was obliged to plead facts which illustrate 
how the appointment process discriminated against him on the basis of race.  
Furthermore, Harmse must plead facts that might illustrate that he was not shortlisted 
because of his race.  The employer argued that Harmse failed to plead any facts 
about the outcome of the shortlisting process.201 
 
The LC held that the statement of claim as far as the allegation of discrimination on 
the basis of race was sufficiently pleaded.  This does not mean that the statement 
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might not have been more detailed and better crafted.  However, those would be 
matters of detail (completeness or fullness) and elegance rather than substance (no 
cause of action) and embarrassment (vague and embarrassing).  Owing to the latter 
the employer’s objection was dismissed.202 
 
5.2.5 FIFTH OBJECTION 
 
The employer further alleged that Harmse failed to disclose the cause of action 
based on discrimination due to political beliefs and was accordingly vague and 
embarrassing.203 
 
In considering Hermes’s statement of claim,204 the LC stated that the aforementioned 
statement specifically stated that the decision of the employer not to shortlist him for 
any of the three posts constituted unfair discrimination as envisaged in section 6 of 
the EEA on the basis of political belief.  Furthermore, Hermes’s claim was that those 
who were shortlisted and appointed were politically aligned to the political party in 
control of the employer and that he was not sufficiently politically aligned to that 
political party.205  The LC held that it was clear that Hermes’s claim was that he was 
not shortlisted because he was not regarded as being appropriately politically 
aligned.  Owing to the latter, the statement of claim did disclose a cause of action.  
The employer’s exception on that ground was dismissed.206 
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The next issue which the LC had to determine was whether the statement of claim in 
respect of discrimination on the basis of political belief was vague and 
embarrassing.207 
 
In this regard the Court considered various formulated tests.  In the matter of 
International Tobacco Co v Wolheim & others 1953 (2) SA 603 (A) at 613 Greenberg 
JA held that “if an exception is that the declaration is vague and embarrassing, then, 
if it be shown, at any rate for the purpose of his plea, that the defendant is 
substantially embarrassed by vagueness or lack of particularity, it equally should be 
allowed”.208  Such an embarrassment as an excipient alleges must be substantial. 
 
The prejudice allegedly suffered by an excipient must be serious.  Mere 
embarrassment and prejudice, which is not substantial and serious in nature, is not 
enough to render the statement of claim vague and embarrassing.209 
 
The Court held whilst it is correct that Harmse did not spell out in detail the nature of 
his political beliefs, he did plead that he was not regarded as appropriately politically 
aligned with the political party that was in control of the employer.210  Hermes’s 
statement of claim did make adequate and sufficient factual allegations in order to 
enable the employer to respond.211  The identity of the political party in control of the 
employer and the nature of its political beliefs and opinion are hardly matters in 
respect of which the applicant can be substantially embarrassed or seriously 
prejudiced.212  The Court held that the specific and particular view of that political 
party is a matter which, on the basis of the statement of claim as it stands, will and 
must be dealt with in evidence.213 
 
In considering the aforementioned and other factors, the Court held that the 
employer’s allegation that the portion of Hermes’s statement of claim relating to 
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discrimination on the grounds of political belief is vague and embarrassing was 
dismissed.214 
 
5.2.6 SIXTH OBJECTION 
 
The employer further argued that Hermes’s claim as contained in paragraph 30.1 to 
31215 of his statement of claim discloses no cause of action and is vague and 
embarrassing and bad in law because it is, inter alia, based on Chapter III of the 
EEA. 
 
The employer’s objection to the claim based on unfair discrimination on the basis of 
race and political belief related not to the existence of such claim in law, but rather 
how it was pleaded.  The employer’s exception to the “lack of relevant experience” 
claim prompted the Court to consider the existence of such claim in law and to enter 
the real of affirmative action. 
 
5.3 THE REASONING OF THE JUDGE IN RELATION TO AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION 
 
The Court noted that in terms of Chapter II of the EEA, in particular section 6 thereof, 
taking affirmative action measures consistent with the purpose of Chapter III of the 
Act does not amount to unfair discrimination.216  Section 5 of the EEA obliges every 
employer to take steps to promote equal opportunity in the workplace by eliminating 
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215  “30 Furthermore and in any event, the decision as aforesaid constitutes discrimination in that 
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unfair discrimination in any employment policy or practice.217  This section is 
peremptory and applies to all employers.218 
 
The court observed that one of the ways in which an employer can eliminate unfair 
discrimination is by taking affirmative action measures consistent with the purpose of 
the Act.219  If regard was given only to section 6, then the conclusion might be drawn 
that affirmative action is no more than a defence to a claim of unfair discrimination.  
On reading of the Act220, in particular the definition of “affirmative action” in section 
15,221 the Court held that affirmative action had a role that went beyond “the passivity 
of its status as a defence”.  Affirmative action includes “pro-activeness” and “self-
activity” by employers.222  The EEA obliges an employer to take measures to 
eliminate unfair discrimination in the workplace.223 
 
In relation to the concept of suitable qualification, section 20224 specifies a hierarchy 
of elements that make up the content of the concept and specifically singles out 
“relevant experience” for special attention.  It appears from the wording of section 20 
that an employer may unfairly discriminate solely on the grounds of a person’s “lack 
of relevant experience”.  To the extent that he was suitably qualified for the post for 
which he had applied and that the employer failed to comply with the obligations to 
review all relevant factors in determining whether he was in fact suitably qualified, 
Hermes’s claim could conceptually be said to be unfair discrimination.225 
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Hermes’s claim simply put was that, having regard to section 20(3) – (5)226 of the 
EEA: 
 
1. he was suitably qualified for the posts for which he applied; 
 
2. the respondent failed to comply with its obligations to review all the factors 
when determining whether or not he was suitably qualified; 
 
3. the respondent, in contravention of section 20(5), unfairly discriminated 
against him on the ground of his lack of relevant experience. 
 
Harmse pleaded that the employer informed him that the reasons he was not 
shortlisted are:227 
 
“1. the (sole) eligibility criterion was ‘past accomplishments in similar 
circumstances’, with more recent and more longstanding accomplishments 
carrying greater weight; 
 
2. the panel was of the opinion that the applicant’s exposure at strategic level 
management, with policy and strategy as a portfolio was lacking; 
 
3. the applicant’s ‘broad based management of diverse functions’ was something 
limited, both in time and scope of complexity.” 
 
The court held that section 20(1) of the EEA does indeed provide that a designated 
employer must prepare and implement an employment equity plan.  Furthermore, 
section 20 (2) elaborates the contents of such an employment equity plan.  Section 
                                                          
226  “(3) For the purpose of this Act, a person may be suitably qualified for a job as a result of any 
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20 in its entirety, is concerned with more than just the preparation and 
implementation of an employment equity plan as aforementioned.228 
 
The concept of suitably qualified, as elaborated in section 20(3) to 20(5) of the EEA 
applies to the Act229 as a whole and is not limited to Chapter III.  The prohibition 
against unfair discrimination solely on the ground of a person’s lack of relevant 
experience, as contained in section 20(5) of the EEA, applies to all employers and is 
not limited to designated employers.  Similarly, the taking of affirmative action 
measures is the duty of every employer and is not limited to designated employers.  
This aforementioned conclusion is based on section 5 of the EEA.230 
 
The Court further held that the factors which are taken into account by an employer 
when determining whether an employee is “suitably qualified” constitutes an 
“employment policy or practice”.  Section 1 of the EEA defines “employment policy or 
practice” as including but not limited to “selection criteria” and “performance 
evaluation systems”.  Hermes’s allegation as to the reasons why he was not selected 
relate to “selection criteria”.231 
 
The LC further gave consideration to the purpose of the EEA.  In considering the 
latter, the Court held the view that section 20(3) – (5) are an integral part of the steps 
to be taken by an employer to promote equal opportunity in the workplace by 
eliminating unfair discrimination.232 
 
“Lack of relevant experience” is one way which employers could unfairly discriminate 
for the purpose of appointment or promotion.  The EEA in section 6 lists a number of 
grounds on which an employer (whether designated or otherwise) may discriminate.  
The grounds referred to in section 6 do not constitute an exhaustive list.233 
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The question that arise is what an employee can do if an employer’s conduct falls 
within this category of unfair discrimination solely on the ground of “lack of relevant 
experience”?  The Court held that an employee may refer the instance of unfair 
discrimination to the LC.  The latter would be consistent with one of the purposes of 
the EEA, in particular, “promoting equal opportunity and fair treatment in employment 
through the elimination of unfair discrimination”.234  To hold otherwise would place a 
restriction on the jurisdiction of the LC.  Owing to the aforementioned, the employer’s 
exception that the applicant’s claim did not disclose a cause of action, was vague 
and embarrassing and bad in law, was liable to be dismissed.235 
 
The aforementioned dismissal did not resolve the question as to whether failure by 
designated employer to prepare and/or implement an employment equity plan can in 
law constitute unfair discrimination in terms of section 6(1) or 6(2) of the EEA.  The 
Court held that if the ground relied on and alleged by Harmse can be categorized as 
“unfair discrimination” as contemplated in section 6 and section 20(3) – (5) of the 
EEA, then the claim may properly be persuaded in law.236  The allegations in this 
matter do indeed fall within the category of unfair discrimination contemplated in 
section 6 and section 20(3) – (5); however, the Court held that it was not in the stage 
to determine those aspects of the notice of exception not properly raised on a fair 
interpretation of Hermes’s statement of claim.  The issue might raise itself in the 
further prosecution and defence of the matter by the parties therefore the Court held 
it would deal with it at the appropriate time.237 
 
The employer in the matter at hand stipulated that affirmative action may only serve 
as a defence and the Court held that the latter was correct.  However, the real 
answer lies in the determination of who is making the claim of affirmative action.  It 
may be a cause of action on the hands of one and a defence in the hands of another.  
If one has to give regards to section 6 of the EEA, he or she would draw the 
conclusion that affirmative action is no more than a defence to a claim of affirmative 
action.  It can serve as a shield.  However, having regard to the fact that the EEA 
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requires an employer to take measures to eliminate discrimination in the workplace, 
affirmative action can serve as a sword. 
 
The Court considered the Constitution, in particular section 9 thereof, from which the 
EEA is borne.  The protection and advancement of persons or categories of persons 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, by legislative and other measures is 
recognized by the Constitution as part of the right to equality.  In this sense, 
“affirmative action” is more than just a defence or shield.238 
 
The LC further held that there is no doubt that an employer may not unfairly 
discriminate against an employer.  This right is an integral part of the right to equality 
and a necessary condition of the inherent right to dignity in section 10 of the 
Constitution.  If an employer fails to promote the achievement of equality through 
taking affirmative action measures, then it can be said that the employer has violated 
the right of an employee who falls within one of the designated groups not to be 
unfairly discriminated against.239 
 
Similarly, if an employer discriminate against an employee from the designated group 
who is “suitably qualified” as contemplated in section 20(3) to 20(5) of the EEA, then 
the employer has violated the right of such an employee not to be discriminated 
against unfairly.  In either case, the issue is whether the employer has violated an 
employee’s right not to be discriminated against and to this extent; affirmative action 
can found a basis for a cause of action.240 
 
Whether or not employees have a right to affirmative action arising out of an 
employment equity plan is another question altogether.  The LC held that in order to 
answer the latter question, one has to consider the provisions of section 20(1) and 
section 20(2) of the EEA; the EEA as a whole; and the Constitution.  If however an 
employer adopts an employment equity plan that regulates appointments and 
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promotions, then the employees may have a legitimate expectation that the employer 
will act in accordance with the plan.241 
 
The LC held that it was satisfied that the EEA, specifically section 20(3) to (5) 
thereof, read with Chapter II, do indeed provide a right to affirmative action.  The 
exact scope or boundaries of such a right is a matter that will have to be developed 
out of the facts of each case.242 
 
Harmse alleged that he was discriminated against on unspecified “other arbitrary 
grounds”.  He conceded that he has not alleged details as to what other arbitrary 
grounds of discrimination might have been and will therefore not pursue the claim. 
 
As the objections raised on exception are all ill-conceived (save for the “arbitrary 
ground” claim which Harmse did not intend to pursue), the Court dismissed the 
exceptions. 
 
5.4 PRINCIPLE 
 
The principle in the Harmse case is that while affirmative action is normally a defence 
in the hands of an employer who discriminates in favour of a person from a 
designated group, it may also found an unfair discrimination cause of action for an 
employee if an employer fails to promote the achievement of equality through taking 
affirmative action measures.243  Wagaly J reached the rather strained conclusion that 
affirmative action was a right in the hands of an employee from a designated group. 
 
According to Neil Coetzer244 the reasoning of Waglay J is incorrect.  Although the 
Court made a fist of embracing substantive equality, it failed to maintain the 
distinction between Chapter II of the EEA, which deals with the prohibition of unfair 
discrimination, and Chapter III, which deals with affirmative action.245  The Court 
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justified this reasoning by stating that if affirmative action was not a right, it would 
leave employees who were unfairly discriminated against without a remedy if the 
employer failed to promote substantive equality in the workplace.246  The Court did 
not take into account that such employees could still rely on s 9(3) and 23(1)247 of the 
Constitution in order to institute action.248 
 
Conferring a right to affirmative action upon individuals would lead to absurd 
results.249  For instance, what would happen if an employer had already met, or had 
even exceeded, the required level of representivity of all designated groups, but then 
failed to employ a person from a designated group?  In terms of a strict interpretation 
of the Harmse case, that employer could be liable for his or her failure to promote 
affirmative action.250 
 
I agree with Nel that a right to affirmative action would give rise to frivolous lawsuits 
and vexatious litigation.  The Harmse case gave rise to a new debate as to whether 
or not an employee from a designated group could use the provisions of the EEA to 
support a claim for appointment in fulfillment of the objectives of the EEA. 
 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
 
In considering the aforementioned, it is clear that the merits of the Harmse case 
forced us to consider the relationship between unfair discrimination and affirmative 
action, against the background of the Constitution commitment to substantive 
equality.  The decision in the Harmse case sparked a considerable debate.  The 
Court found that the EEA creates a right to affirmative action but left open the 
question whether the position would be the same in terms of an employers’ 
employment equity plan designated in terms of the EEA.  In Harmse case, the Court 
held that if we were serious about substantive equality, if it was not legitimate to ask 
whether affirmative action is a pre-requisite for the elimination of discrimination?  The 
answer was, however suggested to remain no, because it confuses measures and 
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values.  The point at stake is neither elimination of unfair discrimination nor of 
affirmative action.  The value that is at stake is equality.  Both the prohibition of unfair 
discrimination and the obligation to implement affirmative action are mere tools or 
mechanisms to attain or to reach equality. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE INFLUENCE OF DUDLEY v CITY OF CAPE TOWN AND 
ANOTHER (2004) 25 ILJ 305 ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE 
RIGHT TO AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AS APPOINTMENTS 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The Court had an opportunity to consider the relationship between the right not to be 
unfairly discriminated against and the obligation to implement affirmative action in the 
case of Dudley v City of Cape Town & another (hereinafter referred to as “the Dudley 
case”).251  In this case, the Court held that unfair discrimination and affirmative action 
should be kept separate and that a failure to implement affirmative action cannot 
cause for an individual to claim a right to such action, neither as such, nor under the 
guise of unfair discrimination.  A discussion on the background of the case; the 
respondent’s exception; whether the decision of the Harmse case is wrong; and the 
conflict between the two cases will be discussed in this Chapter. 
 
6.2 THE BACKGROUND AND FACTS OF THE DUDLEY CASE 
 
In February 1998, Lilian Dudley (hereinafter referred to as “Dudley” and/or 
“applicant”), was appointed to the position of specialist: health service support on the 
staff of the Cape Metropolitan Council (hereinafter referred to as “the CMC”).252  In 
December 1999 she was seconded to the position Acting Head: Municipal Health 
Service with the CMC.253 
 
During December 2000, the CMC and a number of municipal substructures merged 
to become the City.  In February 2001, the applicant was appointed to the post of 
Interim Manager: Health.254 
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When the position of Director: City Health was advertised in November 2001, its 
principal functions were described as being “to ensure the efficient management of 
Health Services through an effective District Management system”.255  According to 
the statement of case, this position was in all material respects the same as the 
position of Interim Manager: Health, which the applicant occupied at the time.256 
 
The applicant applied for the aforementioned post but was unsuccessful and a white 
male was appointed to the post.  Upon the latter, she wrote to the City Manager on 
24 December 2001 recording her view that she was not properly qualified but had 
demonstrated her competence whilst in the positions previously held by her.257  She 
requested a number of details relating to the appointment process, in particular:258 
 
“1 What were the competencies for the position? 
 
1.1 Which of these competencies did she lack? 
 
2 What were the required qualifications for the position? 
 
2.1 In which respects do her qualifications not meet these requirements? 
 
3. What were her scores for the psychometric assessment? 
 
3.1 Were her scores higher or lower than the successful candidate? 
 
4. Was due consideration given to the provisions of the EEA in terms of the 
appointment? 
 
4.1 If yes, then why were these provisions not followed? 
 
5. Were the guidelines provided by the human resources department for the 
appointment followed? If not, reasons for such failure.  In addition, the 
applicant wanted a copy of the recruitment policy which guided the 
appointment.” 
 
The City Manager replied to the applicant’s queries in the following terms:259 
 
“The competencies/criteria identified as well as assessed for this position are as 
obtained in the application pack.  It is evident from the panel interview that you did 
not “lack” in any of the areas assessed: the scores obtained are all in competent 
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level.  …the competencies in the health portfolio demanded a level above 
competence.  Drawing an extensive research in the field of competency 
assessment, it is competence component that serves as the distinguishing factor in 
selection at this level.  Compared to the appointed candidate, your ratings in these 
factors were consistently lower. 
 
As stated in the advertisement an “appropriate tertiary qualification was asked for.  
Due consideration was given to equity and communicated to the organization and 
applied to the appointment process.  Appointments for the entire directorate were 
looked at in respect of reaching the equity target and here, four out of six 
appointments are from previously disadvantaged groups.  Processes and 
procedures used were in accordance with the adopted recruitment and selection 
policy.” 
 
The recruitment policy referred to by the City Manager was adopted by the City with 
effect from August 2000.  It includes a number of provisions relating to affirmative 
action and employment equity.260 
 
The applicant alleged that she had been unfairly discriminated against on the basis of 
race and/or sex in terms of section 6(1) of the EEA.261  Furthermore, she contended 
that the employer’s failure to employ her constituted a breach of the employer’s 
affirmative action obligations262 in terms of the EEA.263  This, according to the 
applicant, entitled her to relief for two reasons.  Firstly, these breaches in themselves, 
entitle her to ask the Court for relief to enforce the employer’s affirmative action 
obligations.  Secondly, she alleged that the failure to implement affirmative action 
constituted unfair discrimination against her on the basis of race and gender. 
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6.3 THE RESPONDENT’S EXCEPTIONS 
 
In its notice of exception, the City raised five grounds. 
 
6.3.1 FIRST GROUND 
 
The first ground related to an alleged inconsistency between the relief sought by the 
applicant in the present case and that sought by the applicant in the proceedings 
brought under case number C987/02.  This ground was not persisted with.264 
 
6.3.2 SECOND GROUND 
 
The respondent submitted that an employer’s failure to apply affirmative action by 
failing to advantage or prefer a member of a designated group who has applied for 
employment cannot in law constitute unfair discrimination in terms of section 6(1) and 
(2) of the EEA.  On this basis, the City contended that the applicant’s claim as per 
footnote 255 hereof above discloses no cause of action. 
 
6.3.3 THIRD GROUND 
 
The third ground mounted an attack to the applicant’s allegation that the City has 
failed to prepare a proper employment equity plan and/or to adhere to employment 
equity principles and/or to comply with its obligations in terms of Chapter III of the 
EEA, and her consequential prayers for, firstly, an order directing the City not to 
conduct the same unfair discrimination or a similar practice in respect of other 
employees and, secondly, to prepare and implement an employment equity plan.265 
 
The respondent raised two contentions in respect of the aforementioned, in 
particular:266 
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“...this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a claim [relating to other employees] in 
circumstances where the complainant has failed to exhaust monitoring, enforcement 
and compliance procedures set out in Chapter V of the EEA.  Secondly, the City 
contends that the applicant has pleaded no fact in support of her alleged entitlement 
to seek relief on behalf of persons other than herself.  The City further denies that 
she has the locus standi to do so.” 
 
6.3.4 FOURTH GROUND 
 
The fourth ground focused on the allegation made by the applicant that she was “a 
better candidate” than Dr Toms and affirmative action should have been applied by 
the City in order to prefer her as a candidate over Dr Toms.267 
 
Owing to the aforementioned allegations not being made in the alternative, the 
respondent raised the contention that they are “mutually inconsistent and/or 
contradictory claims and are accordingly vague, embarrassing and bad in law”.  The 
basis of the latter was that if indeed the applicant was the best candidate for the 
position, then no need would have arisen for her to have been preferred because she 
was black and/or a woman.268 
 
6.3.5 FIFTH GROUND 
 
The fifth ground related on the alleged unfair labour practice which has no relevance 
to this study.  Owing to the latter, the fifth ground is not discussed. 
 
6.4 ARGUMENT 
 
The LC combined the second and fourth ground of exception as they brought into 
focus the nature of affirmative action and its enforceability.  The City’s contentions 
were that:269 
 
“1. …the EEA seeks to promote affirmative action as ‘the product of consensus’ 
between employers and employees; 
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2. the EEA does not lend itself to ‘employee driven litigation’ as means to resolve 
disputes about how affirmative action objectives are to be realized; 
 
3. no time-limit is prescribed for the completion by an employer of its 
employment equity plan, although a tardy employer may be disadvantaged; 
 
4. disputes about failure to prepare an employment equity plan and disputes 
about a failure to implement such plan are treated differently; 
 
5. the EEA includes extensive provisions relating to the role of inter alios labour 
inspectors in ensuring compliance with the requirements relating to an 
employment equity plan; 
 
6. those provisions fall short of direct access to this Court by a disgruntled 
employee; 
 
7. affirmative action is not available to an individual employee for use as a 
“sword” in the prosecution of a claim, but as a “shield” for an employer to 
protect might otherwise amount to discriminatory practices; 
 
8. affirmative action is, correspondingly, not intended to be invoked for the 
benefit of individuals but to advance group of interest.” 
 
It was the City’s argument that affirmative action measures are to be formulated and 
implemented on a group basis since they will inevitably involve a degree of 
discrimination against some persons within a previously advantaged group.  They 
require protection; to this end, affirmative action incorporates the function of a 
shield.270 
 
6.5 COURT’S FINDING 
 
Mr Rose-Innes, for the City, underlined the distinction to be drawn between the 
prohibition of unfair discrimination contained in Chapter II and the detailed provisions 
for measures to be taken to implement affirmative action set out in Chapter II.271  The 
Court noted that there are indeed points of distinction that were significant to the 
case.  The prohibition against unfair discrimination is directly enforceable by a single 
aggrieved individual or by the members of an affected group.  The structure of 
Chapter III is such that, by definition, it is intended to and can be brought into 
operation only within a collective environment. 
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This is inherent in the nature of duties of an employer outlined in section 13(2), in 
particular, consultation, analysis, preparation of an employment equity plan and 
reports to the Director-General on progress in the implementation of the plan.272 
 
The LC considered section 16(2) and section 17 of the EEA which makes reference 
to the conduction of an analysis referred to in section 19.273  The analysis described 
in section 19 is the foundation for the construction of the employment equity plan.  It 
warrants emphasis that employees are to be consulted.274  Employees are to be 
involved in identifying “employment barriers” and the “degree of under-
representation”. 
 
The LC further considered section 20 of the EEA and it further transpired that 
employees are to be consulted in relation to the submission of the reports to the 
Director-General pursuant to section 21 of the EEA.275  The provisions of Chapter III, 
as briefly explained in footnote 268 hereof, display clearly that its essential nature is 
programmatic and systematic.  Importantly, its methodology is uncompromisingly 
collective.276 
 
The Code of Good Practice setting out several objectives and guidelines in relation to 
the consultation process also underlines the methodical nature of the process.277 
 
The LC further considered Chapter V of the EEA which deals with monitoring and 
enforcement which was relevant to the case at two levels:  they furnished additional 
                                                          
272  Ibid. 
273  Act 55 of 1998. 
274  (2004) 25 ILJ 305 (LC). 
275  “Those are detailed reports and traverse all material matters from the initial consultation process 
through the numerical goals that have been set.  Those goals require tribulation of different 
occupational categories against targets for African, coloured, Indian and White males and, 
distinctly, females for each category.  The year in which those numbers are intended to have 
been satisfied must be given.  The EEA then sets out further provisions: every such report is a 
public document; publication is required; successive employment equity plans are required …” 
See (2004) 25 ILJ 305 (LC). 
276  (2004) 25 ILJ 305 (LC). 
277  “…all employees should be made aware and informed of – the content and application of the 
Act as preparation for their participation and consultation: …the need for the involvement of all 
stakeholders in order to promote positive outcomes.  In setting objectives and developing 
corrective measures, parties to the consultative process should attempt to reach consensus on 
what would constitute reasonable progress over the duration of the plan.”  See (2004) 25 ILJ 
305 (LC). 
 69 
insight into the nature of affirmative action within the meaning of the EEA and they 
provide an answer to the question whether the applicant was entitled to approach the 
LC directly with an action grounded on affirmative action. 
 
Mr Rose-Innes argued that the enforcement of Chapter II is undertaken through the 
declaration of a dispute in terms of section 10 of the EEA, which posits the CCMA as 
the initial forum.  In the event that conciliation is unsuccessful, the dispute falls to be 
adjudicated by the LC.  That route had been followed by the applicant and no 
complaint had been raised.278  Mr Rose-Innes further argued that any issue arising in 
respect of Chapter III of the EEA falls within the framework of Chapter V. 
 
Mr Whyte, for the applicant, argued that the LC’s powers under section 50 of the EEA 
are broad enough to accommodate a direct affirmative action claim.  He further 
contented that the procedures set out in Chapter V provide for an “administrative 
enforcement” route which an employee may elect to follow, but do not exclude direct 
recourse to the LC.  The LC did not agree with the latter.279 
 
The applicant further, in support of the contention that she has an individual right to 
affirmative action, placed reliance on the judgment of Waglay J in Harmse v City of 
Cape Town.  The LC at the matter at hand was unable to follow the Harmse case 
reason being that the learned judge, Waglay J, had not sufficiently maintained the 
distinction between Chapters II and III that the interpretation of the EEA requires.  If 
due affirmative action measures have not been applied by a designated employer, 
that gives rise to an enforcement issue under Chapter III and not unfair discrimination 
claim under Chapter II.280 
 
Furthermore, the LC held that there is with respect no sound basis upon which 
section 20(3) – (5) fall to be read together with the provisions of Chapter II and, 
likewise, no basis upon which that can produce a right to affirmative action.  The 
prohibition in section 20(5) against unfair discrimination solely on the ground of lack 
of relevant experience relates only to the determination to be made in subsection (4) 
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concerning whether a person is “suitably qualified” for the purpose of the employment 
equity plan.281  If there is a contravention of subsection (5) that is a matter for the 
enforcement procedures prescribed in Chapter V.  It does not give a claim in terms of 
Chapter II and does not bring about an individual right to affirmative action.282 
 
The LC held that the City must succeed in its exception on the second, third and 
fourth, fifth ground.  It was held that the reasons for the latter was based on both the 
contention raised by the City, in particular, that the EEA does not establish and 
independent individual right to affirmative action and also that there is no right of 
direct access to the LC in respect of any such claim.  It followed further that the 
applicant did not have the locus standi to approach the LC directly for an order that 
the City is to prepare and implement an employment equity plan.  That is an 
enforcement issue catered for in Chapter V.283 
 
Moreover, the LC held that the conclusion that the applicant has no individual right to 
affirmative action in terms of the EEA applies also in relation to the City’s affirmative 
action policy. 
 
6.6 CONFLICTING VIEWS BETWEEN HARMSE CASE AND THE DUDLEY 
CASE 
 
The two conflicting decision of the LC in the Harmse and Dudley case have 
significant impact on other subsequent cases the reason being that it is the first two 
ground breaking cases dealing with the aspects of affirmative action.284 
 
Owing to the aforementioned, it is necessary to observe how different courts interpret 
these two judgments.285  In my view, the absence of affirmative action was confused 
with unfair discrimination in Harmse v City of Cape Town.286  Taking into 
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consideration the latter, the correct way for the court to progress would be to follow 
the interpretation in Dudley v City of Cape Town.287 
 
The Court referred to the Dudley case, stating there was no such thing as an 
individual right to affirmative action.  Moreover, failure to comply with affirmative 
action measures under Chapter III gave rise to an application to the Director-General 
of Labour under Chapter II.288  In no way does section 20 and Chapter II if read 
together create a right to affirmative action.289 
 
There are several cases concerning the right to affirmative action which was dealt 
with after the judgment delivered in the Dudley case some of which are discussed 
hereunder.290 
 
In Cupido v GlaxoSmithKline SA (Pty) Ltd (2005) 26 ILJ 868 (LC), the applicant, a 
coloured man, alleged that he had suffered racial discrimination when seeking 
promotion as Human Resources Officer. 
 
He alleged that as the respondent had failed to implement an employment equity 
plan as required by section 20 and 36 of the EEA, the dispute fell under Chapter III of 
the EEA on affirmative action.  The respondent excepted to this contention on the 
grounds that the applicant had no right of access to the LC in terms of Chapter III of 
the EEA.291 
 
The Court referred to Dudley v City of Cape Town, stating that t here was no such 
thing as an individual right to affirmative action.  The Court did not hesitate to point 
out that the construction of the EEA in the Dudley case was clearly correct and 
logical, whilst the reasoning applied by the Court in the Harmse case was rejected.292 
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In Willemse v Patelia NO & others,293 the applicant, a disabled white male, applied 
for promotion as Director: Biodiversity Management at the Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism.294  He had been recommended for the position 
by a selection committee that had noted his exceptional qualifications for the post.295  
The Acting Director-General of the Department did not accept their recommendation 
because the applicant was not representative of the demographics of the country or 
in accordance with the imperative of transformation, and was obliged to give effect to 
the Constitution in this regard.296  The court held that the Director-General had acted 
with the sole purpose of enhancing gender representativity and had applied 
affirmative action in an arbitrary and unfair manner.297 
 
The court did not mention Harmse or Dudley.  However, the court did mention the 
obligations imposed on employers to give effect to section 9(2) of the Constitution 
and provide for affirmative action measures.298 
 
It did not dispute the legitimacy of such defence in the case of an employer 
implementing such measures, but it was far more concerned with how they were 
implemented.299 
 
This decision illustrates well how the EEA was designed to work, because the 
applicant’s claim was brought under Chapter II of the EEA, and not Chapter III, as 
was suggested in Dudley v City of Cape Town.300  Therefore, although the judgment 
does not directly discuss whether affirmative action is a right or a defence, it can be 
inferred, from the Court’s approach to the matter, that it supports the approach in 
Dudley.301 
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In Public Servants Association on behalf of Karriem v SA Police Service & another,302 
the applicant, a coloured female, alleged that t he South African Police Service 
(hereinafter referred to as “the SAPS”) had discriminated unfairly against her by 
failing to appoint her to an advertised post and appointing a white woman instead.303  
The grounds of discrimination were claimed to be race (section 6 of the EEA) or, 
alternatively, lack of experience (section 20 of the EEA).304  The evidence showed 
that the white woman had outscored the applicant in the objective criteria set for the 
position, and had been appointed because the SAPS’s operational requirements 
required that the employee perform the necessary functions immediately.305 
 
The Court held that there had been no unfair discrimination in this matter, since the 
appointment was made because of the very real and understandable operational 
requirement of the SAPS.306 
 
Concerning the alleged breach of section 20 of the EEA by the employer, the Court 
held that claims relating to affirmative action fell within Chapter V of the EEA, in 
which section 36 sets out the relevant procedure to be followed.307  As a result, the 
Court held, there was no independent individual right to affirmative action, neither 
was there a right of direct access to the LC in respect of such claim.308  It is clear that 
the Court in this case agreed with the decision in Dudley v City of Cape Town.309 
 
It is interesting to note that the decision of Dudley v City of Cape Town was recently 
heard on appeal.310  Unfortunately, the judgment is disappointing in that the Labour 
Appeal Court (hereinafter referred to as “the LAC”) refrained from expressly 
answering the pivotal question once and for all regarding the existence of a right to 
affirmative action.311 
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Sharing the view of Christopher Garbers, I am of the view that the judgment in the 
Dudley case was correctly decided and when it was decided, there was nothing more 
than to take affirmative action at the face value that it was given by legislature in the 
EEA and the solution provided by the wording of the EEA. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
When affirmative action was implemented, it resulted in white people being 
overlooked in favour of non-white people; their reaction was one of being victims, in 
that non-whites are being preferred above themselves.  What they do forget is that 
during the apartheid era, whites were preferred above non-whites, irrespective of 
their qualifications. 
 
Racism was deeply rooted in the workplace in South Africa where white people were 
largely afforded better opportunities than their black counterparts.  This position 
eventually changed after South Africa became a democratic country.  In the new 
South Africa legislation has been adopted to combat unfair discrimination.  This 
legislation is founded upon the equality clause contained in section 9 of the 
Constitution.  Section 9 prohibited unfair direct or indirect discrimination against any 
person on any of the listed grounds. 
 
Thereafter, the EEA was enacted to bring equality to the workplace and give effect to 
section 9(2) of the Constitution.  Section 6 of the latter contains the main thrust of the 
EEA which prohibits unfair discrimination. 
 
The reason for the implementation of affirmative action in South Africa was to ensure 
that the majority black population would be afforded the same opportunities and 
benefits of their white counterparts.  The advantage of implementing affirmative 
action was that it would reverse existing conditions of those who have been 
disadvantaged.  The disadvantage, however is that it stigmatises people and in some 
instances people are placed into positions based on preferential treatment rather 
than based on merit.  Critics have stated that affirmative action and the introduction 
of the EEA could also be a form of reverse discrimination in that it is a fight of black 
versus white. 
 
It is evident that not everyone benefits from affirmative action measures.  As per 
section 9(2) of the Constitution, the beneficiaries of affirmative action measures may 
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be “persons or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination”.  
According to section 2(b) of the EEA, the goal of affirmative action is that “affirmative 
action measures” should be taken by “designated employers” to ensure the 
“equitable representation” of “suitably qualified” persons from the “designated 
groups” in all occupational categories and levels at workplace. 
 
Affirmative action measures are dependent on occurrence of unfair discrimination.   
 
It is evident in this study that there are indeed affirmative action measures designed 
to achieve the primary object of affirmative action.  It further transpired that the Code 
of Good Practice: Preparation, Implementation and Monitoring of Employment Equity 
Plans also gives further guidance about affirmative action measures to be 
implemented by a designated employer.  Both the employee and designated 
employer have a vital role to play. 
 
The legal position regarding the enforcement of affirmative action in terms of the EEA 
is sound and understandable.  By the question still remains whether or not in practice 
it is as systematic as it is constructed in the EEA; furthermore; whether or not 
employees are exposed to such enforcement measures. 
 
Over the past years, courts have regularly been called upon to evaluate the 
enforcement of affirmative action measures.  In the case of Harmse, we were forced 
to consider the relationship between unfair discrimination and affirmative action 
against the background of the Constitution commitment to substantive equality.  The 
court found that the EEA creates a right to affirmative action but left open the 
question whether the position would be the same in terms of an employers’ 
employment equity plan designated in terms of the EEA. 
 
In the case of Dudley, a conflicting view was held.  The court in the case of Dudley 
held that there was no such thing as an individual right to affirmative action and 
failure to comply with affirmative action measures under Chapter III of the EEA gave 
rise to an application to the Director-General of Labour under Chapter II.  In no way 
does section 20 and Chapter II of the EEA if read together create a right to 
affirmative action. 
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Sharing the view of Christopher Garbers, I am of the view that the judgment in the 
Dudley case was correctly decided and when it was decided, there was nothing more 
than to take affirmative action at the face value that it was given by legislature in the 
EEA and the solution provided by the wording of the EEA. 
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